Reciprocal dumping under antidumipng enforcement

Title
Reciprocal dumping under antidumipng enforcement
Authors
Nilanjan Banik
Keywords
logistics, dumping, antidumping
Issue Date
2006
Publisher
인하대학교 정석물류통상연구원
Series/Report no.
Journal of international logistics and tradevol.4 no.11-16 pp.
Abstract
In a dynamic extention of the reciprocal dumping approach, oligopolistic firms
producing imperfect subtitutes use the carrot and stick strategy to enforce
cooperative behavior. When dumping occurs, firms lobby for tariffs as
punishment. After a finite punishment period, the non-dumping equilibrium is
restored. Conditions are derived on the degrees of substitutablility and
observability that allow non-dumping under an infinite horizon. the model
suggests the degree of substitutability between goods and the market interest
rate, affect the likelihood of dumping.In a dynamic extension of the reciprocal dumping approach, oligopolisitic firms
producing imperfect substitutes use the carrot and srick strategy to enforce
cooperative behavior. When dumping occurs, firms lobby for tariffs as
punishment. After a finite punishment period, the non-dumping equilibrium is
restored. Conditions are derived on the degrees of substitutability and
observability that allow non-dumping under an infinite horizon. The model
suggests the degree of substitutability between goods and the market interest
rate, affect the likelihood of dumping.
URI
http://dspace.inha.ac.kr/handle/10505/688
Appears in Collections:
연구기관 > 대학부설 연구소 > 정석물류통상연구원 > Journal of international logistics and trade
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