A Comparative Study of the Translated Korean and Japanese History Textbooks: A Canadian Perspective

Tyzen Ario
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Tyzen Ario
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Tyzen Ario

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Abstract

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Tyzen Ario
Department of Political Science and International Relations
Graduate School
Inha University

In order to overcome historical grievances, countries must choose to either forgive or forget past misdeeds. For example, France and Germany have chosen the forgiveness model after World War II, and are both now firmly entwined in the European Union. As another example, Canada and the USA fought the War of 1812 against one another, but since then most people in both countries have forgotten the conflict, and the two countries share the longest undefended border in the world.

South Korea and Japan represent two more neighbouring countries that have a strong trade relationship and could be reasonably expected to have warm relations. However, such is not the case, as numerous problems flare up almost yearly. There is nothing even close to an Asian Union to mirror the European Union, nor any trade agreement as all-encompassing as NAFTA between South Korea and Japan. Rather, ties between the two countries are often strained.

Disputes over the Japanese occupation period and World War II are a major reason for friction between the two countries. National history is an important subject in both countries, and the people themselves are proud of their country's history. However, most people are not history majors, nor do they enjoy studying history on their own. Due to this, for most people, their main source of historical knowledge is their school textbooks. If the textbooks are biased in any way, that bias will affect the students who read those books, and then will affect how they view their country's foreign policy.

To establish that the people in each country do in fact think differently, this paper analyzes survey data from the International Social Survey Programme 2003: National Identity II dataset. As it turns out, while people in both countries are proud of their own country and proud of their country's history, the people of each country have different views on foreign policy. The South Korean people do
not feel close to other Asian countries, while the Japanese people do. And the South Korean people support their own government even if their government is in the wrong, and say that their government should always do whatever is most beneficial for South Korea even if other countries are antagonized by it. The Japanese hold the opposite view. Clearly, the people do have very different mindsets.

As the contents of the textbooks used in each country varies, it is probable that this has something to do with the difference in people's opinions between the two countries. Therefore, this paper does a grammatical analysis of a selection of books from each country: seven Japanese books and four South Korean books. To permit detailed analysis, the coverage of four major events shared between the two countries is compared: The Kanghwa Incident and the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty, The Imo Mutiny and Kapsin Coup, The Tonghak Rebellion and Sino-Japanese War, and the Samil Movement. The most critical events including the comfort women and other atrocities in the inter-war period were not covered because Japanese translation suddenly stopped in 1920.

This paper finds that the reputation of Japanese textbooks as being whitewashed is quite overstated, as all these events are mentioned in the books, sometimes in even more detail than some of the Korean books use. Though some major events are either glossed over or not mentioned, the assassination of Empress Min is a major omission, one Japanese book does mention it. Furthermore, Japanese books usually do accept some level of blame for all these events – even ones such as the Imo Mutiny, which are usually depicted as being completely domestic events by most of the Korean books. The Korean books for their part tend to use most emotionally-charged language than the Japanese books, which is problematic as that writing style encourages readers to respond emotionally rather than rationally to the material presented. In addition, the Korean books usually encourage students to view Japan excessively negatively and Korea excessively positively.

The paper ends with a few recommendations: first, that the Japanese books take more care not to omit certain important events as the assassination of Empress Min and to avoid emotional language. The Korean books should take care to avoid emotional language, and also to avoid encouraging students to dislike Japan or to overly like Korea. It would be best for the two countries to write a mutual textbook following the model of Falk Pingel: each page divided into three columns, the left and right ones each telling one side of the story, and the middle left blank so that students and teachers can decide what elements of each version to accept or reject.
국문초록

한국과 일본의 영문 역사 교과서 비교 연구

타이젠 아리오

정치외교학과(국제관계)
인하대학교 대학원

과거 역사의 화해를 위해서는 가해자 정책국이 피해국에게 행한 과거사를 피해국가의 국민들이 용서하거나 잊어 버려야 할 것이다. 예를 들면 2차대전 후 프랑스와 독일이 서로 용서하는 것을 선택했고 지금은 EU 회원국으로 유럽 안보문제에 긴밀하게 협력하고 있다. 다른 예로써 캐나다하고 미국이 1812년에 전쟁은 일어났지만 그 이후에 양국 국민들은 그 전쟁의 기억을 극복하였고 세계에서 가장 긴밀하게 분쟁없이 평화로운 국경을 공유하고 있다.

한국과 일본은 활발한 무역관계와 인적 교류를 발전시켜 오고 있으나 역사문제 때문에 양국관계가 냉각되는 일을 반복하고 있다. 양국간의 과거 사 문제와 갈등의 원천은 주로 일제시대와 2차대전에 대한 역사기술의 문제에서 비롯된다. 국제관계사에 대하여 대부분의 대중들은 깊이 있게 연구하지 않기 때문에 그들의 지식의 근거는 주로 교과서이다. 만약 어떤 식으로든 교과서에 과장과 편견이 있으면, 그 편견은 교과서를 읽는 학생들에게는 영향을 미칠 것이다. 그리고 그들이 상대국의 외교 정책을 어떻게 보는가 하는 태도에도 영향을 미칠 것이다.

이 논문은 International Social Survey Programme 2003: National Identity II dataset 의 조사 데이터를 분석해 본 결과, 한일 양국 국민들이 자신의 나라의 역사에 대해서는 자긍심을 가지고도 상대국의 외교정책에 대한 인식은 서로 적지 않은 차이가 있음을 알 수 있었다. 한국 사람들은 주변국에 대하여 경계심을 갖고 있는 반면 일본 사람들은 아시아 이웃나라에 대하여 상대적으로 적대감을 적게 느끼는 것으로 보고되었다.
그리고 한국 사람들도 자신의 나라 정부의 잘못에 대해서는 상대적으로 관대한 민족주의적 성향이 있다고 조사되었다. 즉 한국인들은 다른 주변국에 대하여 부정적인 견해를 갖는 것이 한국의 국익에 유익하다면 크게 문제가 되지 않는다고 보는 것이다. 이와 달리 일본 사람들은 다르다. 다른 견해를 갖고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 분명히 두 나라의 사람들은 주변국과의 관계에 대한 인식에서 생각하는 방법이 다르다.

이러한 차이는 두 나라가 쓰는 교과서가 상대의 과거 행동을 묘사하는 방식이 다르므로서 생겨난 것일 수 있다는 점이 본 연구의 관심사항이다. 따라서 이 논문은 두 나라의 교과서를 몇 권을 선택해서 문법적 분석을 시도하였다. 일본 교과서 일곱 권을 선택하였고 한국 교과서 중 번역된 네 권을 선택하여 분석하였다. 자세한 분석을 허용하려면 두 나라의 교과서는 각 교과서 일축정한 주요 사건들의 범위가 정해져야 한다. 강화도 침략, 임오 전쟁, 감신 정변, 동학 농민 운동과 3.1 독립운동을 조사대상으로 선택하였다.

이 논문의 조사 결과, 일본 교과서가 일방적으로 자국에게 유리하게만 기술되었기 때문에, 일본 교과서에 언급되어 있고 한국 교과서보다 더 자세한 경우도 있었다. 단지, 가능하면 언급을 회피하려고 했던 부분은 일본 정부의 사주로 자행된 명성황후 암살사건. 반면, 한국 교과서는 일본 교과서에도 그런 경향이 있지만 사용하는 언어가 더 감정적인 경향이 발견되었다. 그래서 읽는 학생과 독자들도 하여금 그 역사에 대해서 냉정하게 역사적 사실로만 받아들이지 않고 감정적으로 생각하게 만들 가능성이 있다. 또한, 한국 교과서는 배우는 학생들로 하여금 일본을 과도하게 부정적으로 보고 한국은 대체로 긍정적으로 보게 하는 경향이 있다.

덧붙여 이 논문은 두 가지 정책적 제안을 시도하였다. 첫 번째 일본 교과서는 한국인들이 가장 민감하게 받아들이는 명성황후의 암살, 여성에 대한 비인도적 행위인 위안부 문제 등에 있어서 일본이 숭가지 않고 역사적 사실을 객관적으로 기술해야 한다. 한국 교과서도 상대편 일본을 과도하게 적대화하는 감정적인 표현 방식을 자제할 필요가 있다. 두 번째는 두 나라가 Falk Pingel의 모델에 따라 공용 교과서를 쓰는 것이 좋을 것이다. 자세하게 말하면 한 페이지에 세 항목으로 나누어서 양쪽에는 두 나라의 역사기술 내용을 쓰고 중간 부분은 빈 공간으로 남겨 놓는 것이다. 이렇게 하면 학생들과 교사들이 어느 쪽에 기술 내용에 동의하느냐 거절하는 것을 스스로 결정할 수 있을 것이다.
I. Introduction

In order to overcome historical grievances, countries must choose to either forgive or forget past misdeeds. This is often a problem in the Balkan region of Europe, which are constantly fighting one another because the people there refuse to either forgive or forget historical wrongs. This can be extended to East Asia as well. Many wrongs have been done over time, and the various nations of East Asia tend to remember those wrongs well, and refuse to forgive them\(^1\). This is especially puzzling in the current era of expanding trade links worldwide and also expanding regional integration. East Asians should be doing more to cooperate with each other, but instead continually have disputes with each other, mostly centred on World War II issues.

This can be compared with the case of Europe. Both Europe and East Asia were torn apart in the fighting of World War II. However, since the war ended, Europe has proceeded to integrate itself to a greater and greater degree, so that at present it has a European Union in action. The countries of Europe have decided to tie themselves together both economically and politically to an extent never before witnessed. Germany, the aggressor state in Europe in World War II is now the linchpin of the EU. Its Deutschebank was the model for the EU central bank, and it was a founding member of the EU and one of the first countries to adopt the Euro

\(^1\) As counterexamples, Germany and France have not forgotten their past animosity, but those countries maintain peaceful relations in the European Union – an example of forgiveness. The USA and Canada fought a war in 1812, but now have the longest undefended border in the world, while the people of those two countries have forgotten their past animosity.
currency. Germany has been successfully rehabilitated and is now welcomed as part of the greater European society.

East Asia, on the other hand has made no significant moves on that front. While regional trade flows are large, and the economies of Japan, South Korea, and China can be said to be integrating economically, there is no such political integration. Instead, these countries have consistently had strained relations, generally due to historical grievances. So why have these problems continued?

This paper intends to examine the question of why relations between East Asian countries are relatively poor even sixty years after the end of World War II. While there are many factors that must play into this phenomenon, this paper intends to show that the history textbooks used are an important factor. In the interest of actually completing this paper, this paper will focus on South Korea and Japan, as they are perhaps the most closely linked of the East Asian countries, and also because their relationship has been the perhaps the most contentious in the post-World War II period.

The goal of this paper is to demonstrate that Japanese and South Korean people think differently about each other, and that one major reason for this is the difference in textbooks used in the two countries. This leads to the secondary goal of making recommendations for changes that the two countries should make to their textbooks.

The paper opens with a review of the textbook issue in South Korea and Japan, looking at previous works on the issue and the history of the textbooks issue in Korea and Japan. This section first explains why the textbook issue is important, and then goes into the history of the textbook issue. Owing to a lack of previous English language works on textbooks in Korea, this section is necessarily focused on the
Japanese textbooks.

Following this is a section on public opinion in South Korea and Japan. This section uses the dataset from the International Social Survey Programme 2003: National Identity II (ISSP 2003), identification number ZA3910. The responses to certain selected questions were cross-tabulated between the two countries South Korea and Japan, with a chi-square test done to make sure the results were statistically significant, which they were. The questions selected focus first on respondent’s views of their own country and then views on other countries. The results clearly demonstrate that the people in each country do have very different views, though it cannot be demonstrated that textbooks are the only reason for the difference in attitudes.

Following this section, the method of grammatical analysis used in this paper is explained, and then this paper analyses a broad spectrum of history textbooks from the two countries, seven from Japan and four from South Korea. The paper looks at how the textbooks depict four important events from South Korea and Japan’s shared history: The Kanghwa Incident and Korea-Japan Amity Treaty, the Imo Mutiny and Kapsin Coup, the Tonghak Peasant Rebellion, and the Samil Independence Movement. The language used to describe the events and what details are included or omitted are analysed.

Finally, some recommendations are made for the authors of textbooks in each country. Further, the paper will outline a possible framework for textbook creation based on Pingel's model.

There are some limitations to this work. The most important is that this paper uses available English translations of the Japanese textbooks. These translations only cover the time period from the Meiji Restoration to a little after the end of World War
I. As a result, many important events in ancient history or even reasonably older history, such as the Hideyoshi invasions of Korea cannot be compared. Of greater importance in the current age, the treatment of World War II cannot be compared, as the translated Japanese books cut off before that point. Of major importance to Korean people, the assassination of Empress (Queen) Min is absent from all but one Japanese book, and the comfort women issue is absent from all – though this may have much to do with the translation cutting out before World War II. Notably, Congressmen Evans and Smith introduced a resolution in the US House of Representatives which passed in July 2007 condemning the Japanese treatment of the comfort women issue. To quote the preamble of the resolution, “some textbooks used in Japanese schools minimize the ‘comfort women’ tragedy and other atrocities, and distort the Japanese role in war crimes during World War II; and

Whereas Japanese Government officials, both elected and career, as recently as June 2005, praised the removal of the term ‘comfort women' from Japanese textbooks.” Deploring that “Whereas some textbooks used in Japanese schools minimize the ‘comfort women' tragedy and other atrocities, and distort the Japanese role in war crimes during World War II,” the resolution called on Japan to educate current and future generations about this horrible crime against humanity. These are the most important of Japanese transgressions, and their omission does much to make the Japanese books less reliable. Being unable to compare the treatment of World War II-related issues may have skewed the results of this thesis. This should be noted as a major weakness of this paper.
II. The History Textbook Issue in Korea-Japan

Relations

1. The Importance of History Textbooks

The first question to be answered is “why does history matter?” History in East Asia, according to Sato (in Larsson, Booth, and Matthews 1998, 307), “forms the important foundation for human existence. It has to be said that the role of the past in East Asia is extremely important compared with its role in the Western cultural sphere. People are seeking in history some kind of basis for their own existence... ... the past is seen as the most trustworthy "mirror on mankind". What is being sought from public historiography is not a history, but the history, the reliability of which is, people undoubtedly believe, guaranteed by non-commercial governmental editorship.” The second paragraph brings up an important point – what is wanted in East Asia is not “a” history, but “the” history. A single unified account of the path taken by a country from the distant past to the present. Many countries face problems because many groups in society do not believe they really belong together with the other groups. If all groups in a single state believe in their own separate histories, then it is likely that they will eventually want to partition the country. If groups believe that once they were separate nations and should be again, they will resist the central government more strongly, demand more autonomy, or demand their own separate state. This is certainly the case in many African states, where the different tribal groups believe in their own separate history and wish to have their own states. For that matter, the process can perhaps be seen in the current Iraq. Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds feel that they once had a separate past, and do not want to be together with the other groups anymore. Having a single history in a state can help unify the people by
making them believe in the greater “nation” and not only their own particular tribe, clan, or region.

Also, this unified account of history has great political value. Laura Hein and Mark Selden observe (in Nelson 2002, 130): “Stories chosen or invented about the national past are also invariably prescriptive — how people should think and act as national subjects.” States can use history in order to inculcate certain desired values in the citizenry. For example, the famous story in the USA about how George Washington cut down a cherry tree and then admitted to it because he “couldn't tell a lie.” This story serves to teach Americans about the value of honesty to their society. Also, by playing up the moral fibre of the first president, the story helps to confer greater legitimacy to a president who was elected at a time when only men with property and who were not slaves could vote. Finally, it gives pride to Americans because their first president was a good person. By this story and others, American citizens are taught to love their country and taught what values are important to have. These values then inform the decisions of the citizens and their support for different government policies.

The second question is “why do history textbooks matter?” The answer is that in any country, most people are not deeply interested in history. They will not seriously study history at a post-secondary level, not spend much of their free time reading history books. Some might, but that would be a minority. Due to this, it can be expected that the majority of what people know about history comes from the textbooks they had to use in mandatory history classes in school. What is written in those books can strongly influence the generation that receives instruction from them. Nelson (2002, 129) observes that “leaders and educators have long known that the time to first engage the public in narratives of the nation is not during a crisis but
rather when citizens are young, impressionable, and held legally captive in the educational system. One of the tools that social architects use to build a strong foundation for society and nurture the political ideologies that bolster that foundation is the history textbook.” As previously noted, textbooks are an important tool in shaping children into good, well socialized adults. Further, the idealized picture of their country that children receive as children from their history books is likely to remain deeply held in their hearts and minds when they become adults.

The next question is “how does history teaching impact international relations?” To answer this, two ideas will be borrowed from Heisler (2008, 16). “First, the past is present in our lives; its pervasiveness and intrusiveness are evident in daily media reports. Second, like currency, the past is often fungible; it can serve as a medium of exchange in relationships, both within and between societies.” As the quote shows, the past has a great effect on our lives in the present. History informs us and guides us today. One may ask the question “how did I get to where I am today?” The only way to answer this is to look at one's own history. The history of one's own country will naturally impact upon one's personal history, and will colour how one sees the world. If one's country is in a crisis, one may look to history in an attempt to figure out what caused the crisis. Internal matters, external matters, corrupt leadership, and foreign intervention may all have a part to play, and one's knowledge of history helps one decide who to blame. Secondly, history can be a medium of exchange both within and between countries. Thus, history (and the education thereof) can be related to trade – a healthy exchange helps bring countries closer together. A poor exchange of history (both sides claiming a different history, and refusing to exchange ideas) causes countries to move apart. If two countries freely exchange historical data and construct a shared history that appeals to both sides and neither glorifies one country
over the other or blames one country over another, it is possible to have a healthy, peaceful relationship. If two countries each subscribe to a different vision of their shared history and each believes its version to be superior, then a mutual crisis will be harder to avert. Further to that, the populace of each country is more likely to have a distaste for the other country, leading to more support for anti-foreign policies in the government. So history is indeed directly related to international relations.

It is also related to politics. Zimm (in Heisler 2008, 16) points out that political positions are typically embedded in history books, especially textbooks. In addition, Zimm (in Heisler 2008, 16) notes that such positions are usually unacknowledged and sometimes seemingly embraced without their authors’ awareness.” Because these political positions are embedded in the text, it is quite possible that people will take whatever is written as fact, and thus merely conform to the government's wishes. In general, it can be assumed that government screening agencies will attempt to stop the publication of textbooks that contain sentiments that go against the values the current government espouses. Also, such embedded political positions may make it harder for the readers to critically evaluate claims made by either their own government or the governments of other countries.

In addition, Schneider (2008, 113) posits that “Textbooks are inherently political. They represent temporary outcomes of negotiations between various social actors over what counts as legitimate knowledge. The state remains involved through various restraining and control mechanisms, even in countries with a pluralistic textbook system. History and civics textbooks, after all, are also charged with transmitting collective self-concepts and values.” Here may be the greatest indictment of the textbook system worldwide. No matter what country or how pluralistic the system is, there is still state control over what textbooks are allowed to
say. As noted, textbooks are written to conform with what is considered “legitimate” knowledge by negotiation of various elite groups in a country. Therefore, a person may be considered a rebel by the textbooks of a country, and thus be remembered by most citizens in the country as a rebel, when the person was viewed as a hero to a certain ethnic group or region within the country\(^2\). The knowledge deemed legitimate by elites can also be used to galvanize nationalism, even to breed hatred of another country, whether deliberately or by accident.

So we see that historical education is indeed political, as the textbooks are the outcome of negotiation between societal elites and created at least in part to inculcate certain values and ideals that are desired by national leaders. As well, history texts are intended at least in part to help unify a country, particularly in East Asia. As a result, it is easy to believe that history textbooks may be biased toward the vision of history that national leaders want to broadcast. This bias may colour the attitudes of the country’s citizens in many ways, including their support for various foreign policy decisions. As such, history textbooks can help or hinder relations between countries.

2. History of the Japanese/South Korean Textbook Issue

Sometimes, the textbooks themselves may become an issue. This has certainly been the case in South Korea. As Schneider (2008, 109) writes “the transformation of history textbooks into objects of international debate dates from the summer of 1982.” Schneider (2008, 109) also notes that this “first affair displayed various characteristics that would mark those that followed.” The first such

\(^2\) As an example, in Canada, Louis Riel, leader of two rebellions against the central government of Canada, is a divisive individual. Older textbooks depicted him as a rebel, attempting to destroy the central government of Canada. But he is considered by the Metis (half native-half French people) as a hero for resisting the Canadian government's encroachment on their land and rights.
characteristic was that the mass-media triggered the debate and also by poor fact-checking enlarged the debate. The second characteristic was that domestic issues furthered it, so that in Japan, South Korea, and China, the textbook issue played into other issues, such as rising nationalism in Japan or calls for more democracy and less dependence on Japan in South Korea. The final characteristic was that the issue became both a source and challenge to government legitimacy. In Japan's case, the issue was an embarrassment for the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas in South Korea and China the issue was useful, because it made their “history card” stronger, allowing them to gain leverage on Japan. Here we can see that the pattern of discord between Japan and South Korea when it comes to the textbook issue dates back to 1982.

One important caveat should be mentioned at this point. According to Rose (1999, 207), and Schneider (2008, 109), the 1982 issue actually erupted out of nothing. The Japanese newspapers that first broke the story had not properly fact checked, and a subsequent investigation showed that the changes to textbooks reported did not actually exist. A retraction and apology was printed, but only well after the story had broken, and well after the issue had inflamed opinions in South Korea and China. Interestingly, a mistake by a Japanese mass media outlet caused the issue to break, and caused such an international uproar.

In addition, there was one other interesting outcome of the issue – the Japanese Ministry of Education added the “neighbouring countries clause” to its textbook evaluation criteria. This clause states that textbooks authors should give consideration to other countries' perspectives, which encourages Japanese textbook authors to include more critical passages in their work. The clause does stop short of mandating that other countries' perspectives be included in the work, and so it can be
judged to fall short of the goal of including the viewpoints of other countries.

The next textbook crisis erupted in 1986, when the “New History of Japan” textbook, written by the National Committee for the Protection of Japan, was approved. Interestingly, according to Schneider (2008, 110), this was a high school level textbook written for seniors, which raises questions as to who exactly was the target audience. It also raises the question of how much readership it would actually receive. Regardless, the reaction is Seoul was quick and loud, while Beijing instructed its mass media to refrain from action for internal reasons. The minister of education at that time made various insensitive remarks about Korea and China at that time, and subsequently was forced to resign. Despite the resignation, Schneider (2008, 110) reported that this affair strengthened the opinion that Japan lacked remorse for its past actions against Korea and China.

During the 1990s, Japanese awareness of historical issues and Japan's role as a victimizer increased, which spurred a reaction from right-wing groups in Japan. In particular, a group named Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform (Tsukuru-kai) appeared in 1996 and published a junior-high textbook called “New History Textbook.” This textbook was finally approved in 2001 after several government-mandated revisions.

The “New History Textbook” caused another major foreign outcry in South Korea and China. However, within Japan, the use of relativist arguments by the Tsukuru-kai muted some criticism. Schneider (2008, 111) states that by saying history naturally differs from country to country and therefore there is no universal truth, the group could escape some criticism. Regardless, civil society actors in all three countries staged protests, or in Japan, lobbied schools not to adopt the books. This contributed to the very low rate of use of the textbook (0.04% of all Japanese
Regardless, the existence of the book caused major issues. As *The Economist* (2001, 38) reported, “on April 9th [2001] South Korea expressed its displeasure by recalling its ambassador from Japan.” Also, the South Korean side noted (*The Economist* 2001, 38) that “neither this book nor four earlier Japanese history books mention that thousands of girls from Asian countries, mostly from Korea, were made to work in Japanese army brothels.” This information is corroborated in the *Christian Science Monitor* (Baker 2001, 7), which adds that the “comfort women” when referred to in the textbooks are “characterized as volunteers.” Going back to *The Economist* (2001, 38), the article also mentions “Such historical sins of omission should not be tolerated,” according to the South Korean side³. This brings up an important point: to the South Korean side it is not only important what the Japanese textbooks report, but what they do not. For the remainder of this paper, the reader should bear that in mind. It will come into play with both Korean and Japanese textbooks, and is also important in international media coverage of the textbook issue.

In more recent years, the textbook issue has cropped up from time to time, but generally without as much fanfare as previously. It is still, however, true according to Rozman and Lee (2006, 778) that “many South Koreans have been infuriated by what they perceive as Japan’s intention in school textbooks to whitewash its World War Two atrocities. The scholars Rozman and Lee (2006, 778) also point out that in 2005, “the Dokdo/Takeshima controversy, together with anger

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³ Here, it might be interesting to note that Japan-South Korea Normalization Treaty of 1965 included reparations for Japan’s wartime atrocities (in particular the “comfort women”). In exchange, Park Chung-Hee agreed that South Korea would never again ask Japan for more reparations. This money never did reach victims, but was instead used by the Park Chung-Hee government to kick-start Korean economic growth. Thus it can be argued that the South Korean government was also guilty of mistreating the former “comfort women.” This information is not yet included in any South Korean textbooks to this author's knowledge.
over the textbook issue and Koizumi’s continued shrine visits, spurred an infuriated Korean public to nationwide anti-Japanese protests.” As can be seen from this, even when a different major flash point between Japan and South Korea emerges, the textbook issue still remains a major part of the problem.

In Japan according to Rozman (2002, 10), rightists charge that the Korean textbooks often gloss over the problems of the late Joseon dynasty to make it appear that Japan prevented Korean development, and also try to create the impression that Koreans heroically resisted the Japanese during the war era in spite of a great deal of known Korean collaboration. Further to that states Rozman (2002, 10), some people in Japan “complain about the teaching of history in Korea. They see schools concentrating on how in ancient times Koreans taught culture to Japan, while in medieval and modern periods Japanese responded by invading Korea. These messages create a one-sided, negative image of Japan and leave Koreans preoccupied with being victims.” If so, this is also bad for relations between the two countries, as Koreans are systematically taught to hate Japan.

Going back to South Korea, there is almost no coverage about their textbooks internationally. In fact, only one article seems to exist dealing with South Korean history textbooks. Entitled “Seoul's Textbook Detente,” the article is about the inclusion of the Battle of Bocheonbo in South Korean history textbooks. As the article (Choi 2003, A10) says, “Seoul's acknowledgement of the 1937 clash with Japanese colonizers -- by guerrillas purportedly led by future North Korean founder Kim Il Sung -- shows how South Koreans are softening their view of their communist neighbor.” Interestingly, the only part of South Korean history textbooks deemed worth reporting in North America is a part dealing with North Korean actions against Japan. And this only because it demonstrates how South Korea is becoming friendlier
to the North Korean regime. No coverage is given about South Korean textbooks and how they deal with Japan. While it is true that that issue is probably not newsworthy, given a lack of Japanese protests about Korean textbooks, it is still notable that nobody gives any attention to Korean textbooks. The implication is first that the Japanese do not harbour ill-feeling to South Koreans, proved by a lack of protests – which would seem to be a positive factor, and secondly, that South Korean textbooks do not have any errors or debatable content. This latter implication is worth studying, as it seems unlikely that South Korean textbooks should be so perfect – what textbooks anywhere are perfect?

The last paragraph alluded to Japanese people not having the same animosity toward Korean people that Korean people have for Japanese people. It is time to look at prevailing attitudes among Koreans and Japanese in order to see if they do their own countries and other countries differently, and if so, how. If it is accepted that textbooks do have some effect on peoples' perceptions of their own country and others, as has been posited by many authors previously quoted in this paper, then the expectation would be that each country's people would have differing views on their own country and other countries.
III. Differing Opinions in South Korea and Japan

To begin with, Rozman (2002, 6) notes that in a 1995 survey, 63% of South Koreans viewed Japan as the most disliked country, as opposed to 15% for North Korea, and a very small number for any of China, Russia, or the USA. On the other hand states Rozman (2002, 6), 58% of South Koreans also saw Japan as the country South Korea had the most to learn from, around twice the number that chose the USA. Rozman (2002, 10) goes on to point out that during the height of the protests in 2001, a survey conducted from the 8th to the 9th of May disclosed that 59.2% of Koreans thought Korea should consider cutting ties with Japan.

The following survey data is culled from the dataset of the International Social Survey Programme 2003: National Identity II (ISSP 2003), identification number ZA3910. While this survey was conducted in several countries worldwide, for the purposes of this article, only data from South Korea and Japan were used. Following are cross-tabulated results of survey questions asked of Japanese and South Korean people describing how they view their own country and continent. Chi-square tests have been done on all the data shown using SPSS 11.5, and all have come up as statistically significant. All the following tables use data from the ISSP 2003 dataset. After each table, this paper discusses what the results indicate are the prevailing opinions in each country, and how that affects the chances of good relations between the two countries.

To begin with is the question “How close to you feel to your country?”
Table 1: How close do you feel to your own country?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How close do you feel to: [Country]</th>
<th>Japan 0 SK 1</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>476.5</td>
<td>575.5</td>
<td>1052.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within How close do you feel to: [Country]</td>
<td>50.1%</td>
<td>49.9%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td>48.9%</td>
<td>40.4%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>22.2%</td>
<td>22.1%</td>
<td>44.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Close                              | Count        | 461 | 572 | 1033 |
| Expected Count                     | 467.8        | 565.2 | 1033.0 |
| % within How close do you feel to: [Country] | 44.6% | 55.4% | 100.0% |
| % within Japan 0 SK 1              | 42.8%        | 44.0% | 43.4% |
| % of Total                         | 19.4%        | 24.1% | 43.4% |

| Not very close                     | Count        | 79  | 178 | 257 |
| Expected Count                     | 116.4        | 140.6 | 257.0 |
| % within How close do you feel to: [Country] | 30.7% | 69.3% | 100.0% |
| % within Japan 0 SK 1              | 7.3%         | 13.7% | 10.8% |
| % of Total                         | 3.3%         | 7.5%  | 10.8% |

| Not close at all                   | Count        | 10  | 26  | 36  |
| Expected Count                     | 16.3         | 19.7  | 36.0 |
| % within How close do you feel to: [Country] | 27.8% | 72.2% | 100.0% |
| % within Japan 0 SK 1              | .9%          | 2.0%   | 1.5% |
| % of Total                         | .4%          | 1.1%   | 1.5% |

| Total                              | Count        | 1077 | 1301 | 2378 |
| Expected Count                     | 1077.0       | 1301.0 | 2378.0 |
| % within How close do you feel to: [Country] | 45.3% | 54.7% | 100.0% |
| % within Japan 0 SK 1              | 100.0%       | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| % of Total                         | 45.3%        | 54.7%  | 100.0% |


As might be expected, both Japanese and South Koreans prove to be nationalistic. Interestingly, the Japanese score is higher than the South Korean score for “very close,” while the South Korean score is higher than the Japanese score for
“close.” The Japanese appear to be slightly more nationalistic than South Koreans. However, the very low numbers in the categories “not very close” and “not close at all” for both countries demonstrate clearly that South Koreans and Japanese people feel close to their country and are therefore nationalistically inclined.

Next, it is important to examine the contrast between how close Korean and Japanese people feel to their own country and how close they feel to Asia.

**Table 2: How close do you feel to Asia?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>How close do you feel to: continent</th>
<th>Japan 0 SK 1</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>.00</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very close</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>145</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>130.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within How close you feel to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continent</td>
<td>65.3%</td>
<td>34.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td>16.1%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>3.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Close</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>302.0</td>
<td>431.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within How close you feel to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continent</td>
<td>57.2%</td>
<td>42.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td>46.5%</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>19.2%</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not very close</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>254</td>
<td>587</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>346.5</td>
<td>494.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within How close you feel to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continent</td>
<td>30.2%</td>
<td>69.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>45.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not close at all</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>161.1</td>
<td>229.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within How close you feel to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continent</td>
<td>21.2%</td>
<td>78.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td>9.2%</td>
<td>24.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>14.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>1286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>901.0</td>
<td>1286.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within How close you feel to:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>continent</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>41.2%</td>
<td>58.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, on this issue, Japanese and South Korean people seem to think almost the exact opposite way. Nearly half of the Japanese feel “close,” followed up by “not very close,” “very close,” and with the smallest number answering “not close at all.” The South Koreans are almost the opposite of that, with almost half answering “not very close,” followed up by “close,” “not close at all,” and the fewest answering “very close.” This points out that Japanese people feel more warmly toward other Asian people than South Korean people do.

Contrast that with the results of the previous question, and an interesting picture emerges. Both the Japanese and South Korean people feel close to their own country, and thus can be considered to be nationalistic. In fact, of the two, Japanese people seem to feel even closer to their country than Koreans do. The real difference comes with their views on Asia. Most of the Japanese people feel “close” or “very close” to Asia, while most Koreans feel “not very close” or “not close at all” to Asia. Interestingly, despite high nationalism in Japan, the people seem to feel warmly to the rest of Asia. Korea’s results might actually be easier to interpret – due to high nationalism, Korean people feel less connected to Asia, only to Korea itself.

The next question is vital to seeing whether or not history textbooks may have an impact on people’s attitudes: are the people in each country proud of their country’s history?
Table 3: How proud are you of your country’s history?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>how proud of country history</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.00</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>36</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37.1</td>
<td>201.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.8%</td>
<td>20.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within how proud of country history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>40.9%</td>
<td>40.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>8.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan 0.00</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>52</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>50.9</td>
<td>277.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>21.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within how proud of country history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>59.1%</td>
<td>59.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.3%</td>
<td>12.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88</td>
<td>479</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>88.0</td>
<td>479.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan 0 SK 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% within how proud of country history</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.9%</td>
<td>21.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As can be seen, the respondents in both countries responded the same way, within a percentage point of each other for all possible responses. Also, note that
there is no listing for the answer 1 (not proud at all). This means that nobody in either country responded that they were not proud at all of their country's history. People in both Korea and Japan seem to be quite proud of their country's history, as can be seen, in both countries nearly half of the respondents answered 4 (somewhat proud), and nearly 27% in both countries answered 5 (very proud). In both countries, people are proud of their history, and feel close to their country. Ultimately, this level of analysis does not seem to provide answers on why the Japanese and Koreans feel this way, but at least the analysis does tell us important similarities and differences in how those people view their own nations and neighbours. Based on the results here, it would appear that the Japanese can generally be characterized as being very proud of their country's history. Furthermore, the Japanese seem to be quite friendly to other countries in Asia, based on how close they feel to Asia. Korean people are also generally proud of their country's history. Interestingly, however, Koreans are also quite a bit less friendly to other countries, considering how few Koreans felt close to Asia.

History textbooks might actually contribute to this. If Japanese textbooks glorify Japanese history, it would explain the high level of pride in Japanese history. If those same textbooks whitewash historical atrocities committed by Japan, but also do not vilify other countries, that could explain why the Japanese feel closer to Asia, and also the feeling that Japan is better than many other countries. As for Koreans, if Korean textbooks glorify Korean history, then that explains the high level of pride in Korean history. If those same textbooks emphasize how Korea was victimized by its neighbours, and/or vilify other countries, that would explain why Korean people do not feel close to Asia. Having noted this, this paper looks at two other survey questions on foreign relations.
Table 4: A country should follow its own interests regardless of the opinion of other countries.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country should follow own interests regardless of other country opinions</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Japan</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>128.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan</td>
<td>27.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>169.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>298.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should follow own interests regardless of other country opinions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>11.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>298.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Country</td>
<td>0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should follow own interests regardless of other country opinions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>13.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen, in Japan, 45.9% of the respondents either strongly disagree or somewhat disagree with the idea that Japan should follow its own interests regardless of whether or not it causes conflicts with another country. Only 23.9% somewhat agreed or strongly agreed with the idea. This is a strong contrast with South Korea, where only 18.3% of respondents disagreed with the idea that Korea should follow its own interests regardless on whether or not it causes conflicts with other countries. An impressive 56.2% of respondents either somewhat or strongly agreed that Korean should follow its own interests. While the bulk of these respondents answered somewhat agree, not strongly agree, that the majority of Koreans agree is worrisome enough. This finding seems to corroborate the earlier finding that Korean people feel much less a part of Asia than Japanese people do. It stands to reason that if Korean people felt close to their Asian neighbours, they would want to take into account the opinions of other countries. Since they do not feel close to other countries, it is easier for Korean people to discount the opinions of other countries. To bring the textbooks back into this, perhaps if the Japanese criticism is correct, and Korean textbooks are designed to make Koreans feel victimized, and therefore both blameless and also deserving of compensation from others, this survey result makes sense. If Korean people do feel victimized by others and thus cannot be blamed, then it would be easy for Korean people to say that Korea should help itself and not worry about other countries, since Korea was victimized by others before. It can be easily argued that Korea should be allowed more leeway because it was a victim before and so needs to be allowed to do what it wants until the damage is undone.

On the other hand, it could also be argued that as Korea was a victim, it knows the suffering that victims go through. Therefore, Koreans should be unwilling to hurt others, because of their sympathy from having been hurt before. But this
argument does not seem to hold up given the survey data. If Korean people should be sympathetic to others because of being maltreated before, then Korean people should not say that Korea has the right to do whatever is best for it even if that leads to conflict with other countries. In what way is starting a conflict with another country being sympathetic to their needs? This finding does not bode well for the future, and the results of the next (and last) survey question to be considered does not make things appear any brighter.
Table 5: People should support their country even if their country is in the wrong.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>people should support their country even if their country is wrong</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>2.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan 0.00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
<td>185.1</td>
<td>204.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>17.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within people</td>
<td>83.9</td>
<td>39.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>even if their</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wrong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>14.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.00</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
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<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
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<tr>
<td>% within Japan</td>
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<td>21.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within people</td>
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<td>60.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should support</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>their country</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>even if their</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>country is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wrong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Count</td>
<td>417</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected Count</td>
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<td>460.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within Japan</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SK 1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% within people</td>
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<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>should support</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>their country</td>
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<td>even if their</td>
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<tr>
<td>country is</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wrong</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Total</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>19.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table shows, 51.1% of Japanese respondents either strongly disagree or disagree with the statement, and only 24.7% of Japanese respondents agree or strongly agree. Of particular notice, 33.6% of Japanese respondents strongly disagree with the notion that people should support their country even if their country is in the wrong. This again contrasts sharply with the Korean results, where only 26.4% disagreed with the idea that Koreans should support Korea even if Korea is in the wrong. Meanwhile, 56.8% of Koreans agreed that people should support their country, even if their country is in the wrong. On the positive side, 33% of Koreans said they just agree, as compared with the lesser number of 23.8% who strongly agreed. Regardless, it is quite clear that in Japan, people felt that they should not support their country if their country is in the wrong, whereas in Korea, the majority felt that they should support their country, even if their country was in the wrong. This combined with the previous question's results certainly call into question the idea that because Korea was victimized, the people wish not to victimize others. Rather, it seems that Korean people do have a strong sense of nationalism, and feel close to their country. But this is a form of negative nationalism — Korean people appear to love their country above others, and are willing to support their country even if their country is doing bad things.

What all this survey data ultimately demonstrates is that Japanese and Korean people do think very differently about their own and other countries. While both countries' people feel close to their own country and are proud of their own history, they differ in several key ways. In particular, the Japanese seem to think their country is generally better than most, while Korean people don't. On the other hand, Japanese people are also more ashamed of some current things in their country than Koreans are. Most importantly, the Japanese feel closer to Asia, and also don't believe that
their country should do things that cause conflict with other countries and also don't believe that they should support their country even if their country is wrong. Korean people seem to hold almost the exact opposite beliefs.

All this may or may not be explainable in part as a result of textbooks used in the two countries. Unfortunately, this author has been unable to find survey questionnaires that asked specifically about textbooks or textbook issues, or even any questions that were directly related to textbooks. That is an area that could stand to be more carefully researched in the future, and perhaps some researcher will soon attempt a survey that really examines the textbook issue, particularly in East Asia.

Even if some data is lacking, however, it is possible to say that textbooks do help shape the public consciousness of a nation, as has been stated by several authors such as Nelson (2002, 129), quoted on page 6 of this thesis. Taking this as a base, it can be conjectured that the textbooks used up to now in Japan and South Korea may be partly responsible for the different attitudes in the two countries. Certainly, by this point, the number of people still living who were alive during the Second World War are few. Most knowledge of the past must now come from history books, and especially textbooks for those who are not so interested in reading about history. It is possible that the way history has been portrayed so far in Korea and Japan has led to the population of Japan feeling very proud of their country, and yet also friendly to Asia. Whereas history as portrayed in Korea so far has perhaps led to Korean people also being proud of their country and history, yet feeling very separate from the rest of Asia, and also loving their country even to the detriment of other countries, unlike Japan. Also, even should this not be true previously, it might be becoming true now. So it is important to see what the different countries say about their shared history in order to get a sense of why Korean and Japanese people feel so differently about their
countries versus other countries. And to do this, it will be necessary to examine the textbooks.
IV. Comparative Analysis of the Textbooks

1. Method of Grammatical Analysis

In order to make a sound analysis, this paper will employ systemic functional grammar as its tool. Systemic functional grammar has been used for textbook analysis before, most notably (in relation to this essay) in *Isolating Knowledge of the Unpleasant: The Rape of Nanking in Japanese High-School Textbooks*, by Christian Barnard.

As Barnard (2001, 520) writes, one of the aims of systemic functional grammar is to try and relate the text being analyzed to its wider social and cultural context. In particular, it is useful to examine the range of meaning a given sentence, phrase, or even word possesses. Once the range of possible meanings has been found, then it becomes possible to critique the choice of language used. If it was possible to write something in a more conciliatory tone, why was that not used? If it was possible to write something in a more aggressive tone, why was that not done? In addition, what was left out, and why?

It can be said that textbooks are a means of indoctrination into society, a way in which the state attempts to make its children believe in the same myths, stories, ideals, and values it holds dear. This could certainly be said to be true in Japan, as all textbooks in Japan must pass a screening by the Ministry of Education. According to Barnard (2001, 521) this screening system has been denounced as a form of censorship and has been challenged in court many times. However, the system has held against challenges, and so textbooks continue to serve the same role of instilling pride in the nation and trying to inculcate beliefs and values that the state wants. The language of the textbooks can be used to reinforce the lesson. It should be noted that
the Korean textbook system works in much the same way, though this author has not found any reference to legal challenges against the Korean Ministry of Education.

As Barnard (2001, 520) reports, even in the US, textbooks are used to present a mythic version of history in order to instill American pride. The way language is used helps the ideology. For example, President Woodrow Wilson intervened in Mexico, and one textbook reports that Wilson ordered American troops out of Mexico – but the book never mentions those troops having been ordered into Mexico! By avoiding mention of the unpalatable act of ordering troops into another country, Wilson looks more morally correct than he actually was.

In addition, use of the passive voice causes problems because the passive voice tells us the action that occurred but without an actor. This allows an evil act to be criticized without having to blame any specific person for that act. There is a great deal of difference between saying “I kicked the puppy,” and saying “the puppy was kicked.” This kind of obfuscation will be closely examined in the pages to come.

A second key element of language that can be used to shield actors from their acts is the use of labelling. When people use a label, they can specify that an act was done by some other person or group that they do not belong to. For example, the holocaust in Germany. It is very common for German history textbooks to say that X number of Jews were killed at Y by either SS members or Nazis. In both cases, this allows German people to feel less guilty, because they can blame the SS or Nazi members for the atrocities. If the word “SS” or “Nazis” is replaced by “Germans,” (which the SS members and Nazis were, also) then all German people can be blamed. Thus changing labels changes who can be blamed, and who can be absolved of guilt.

With that in mind, it is time to turn to the main focus of this paper: the comparison of history textbooks from Japan and South Korea.
2. Comparing the Textbooks

For the purposes of this paper, eight textbooks from Japan and four from South Korea will be compared and contrasted. The eight Japanese books are the Kyoiku Shippun, Osaka Shoseki, Shimizu Shoin, Teikoku Shoin, Tokyo Shoseki, Fusosha, Nihon Shoseki Shinsha, and the Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan. All of these books were downloaded from the JE Kaleidoscope homepage (http://www.je-kaleidoscope.jp/english/index.html). Also, from this point forth, the books will be referred to as the first word in their respective titles (Kyoiku Shippun becomes Kyoiku, for example) except for Nihon Shoseki Shinsha and Nihon Bunkyo Shuppan, which will be referred to as the Nihon Shoseki and Nihon Bunkyo, respectively. The South Korean books are the Hanguk Geunhyeondaesa by Ju Jin-O, etc., published by Jungang Kyoyuk Jinheung Yeonguso, Hanguk Geunhyeondeasa by Geumseong Chulpansa, Godeung Hakkyo Guksa by Kyoyukgwa Hakgi Sulbu, and Junghakkyo Guksa by Kyoyukgwa Hakgi Sulbu. These books were all purchased in hard copy form, and translated by this author into English. The Korean books will be referred to by the first word of the publisher's name (Jungang or Geumsong), while the two last books will be referred to as “Godeung” and “Jung” respectively.

In order to permit a proper comparison, certain key events in the shared history of Korea and Japan will be selected, and then sample sentences/paragraphs from each book will be compared against other samples from the same country's textbooks and from the other country's textbooks. This way it will be easy to see what is highlighted or omitted between textbooks, how the events are displayed, and how objectively or passionately the events are described. It should also be noted that

While all efforts were undertaken to make certain that the translations were fully correct, it is still possible that errors may have been made. If so, the author apologizes for it.
Korean words will be Romanized either by the Romanization system used in the book being quoted, or in other circumstances, by the Korean Ministry of Education style of Romanization. Events will be referred to by the same spelling throughout.

The four cases selected were the Kanghwa Incident and Japan-Korea Amity Treaty, the Imo Mutiny and Kapsin Coup, the Tonghak Revolt, and the Samil Independence Movement. These cases were selected because they are the four most important events in the shared history of Japan and South Korea that occurred within the timeframe covered by the English translations of the Japanese textbooks. More important issues such as the comfort women could not be covered in this paper, which is a serious limitation of the paper. Excepting the assassination of Empress Min, all the most critical issues between Japan and South Korea cannot be examined in this paper, which means that only issues of secondary importance have been analyzed. Therefore the main conclusion of this paper regarding the Japanese textbooks has an inherent limitation and could be misleading.

It is also important to note that the English translations of the Japanese books that could be downloaded were all limited to the same span of history: from the Meiji Restoration to just before World War II. Due to this, other interesting and important events such as the formation of the Korean and Japanese nations, the Mongol invasion of Korea and subsequent invasion of Japan, the Japanese invasion of Korea under Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and all of World War II could not be investigated. This proves to be the main failing of this study, as two events of critical importance to Koreans are omitted: the assassination of Empress Min, and the comfort women issue in World War II. Only one Japanese book mentions the assassination of Empress Min, and no book mentions the comfort women (though it is possible that this is only because the World War II sections of the Japanese books is unavailable). These
omissions are serious and may have skewed the results of this study. A later paper, perhaps done by someone who can read Japanese, or done when the Japanese release the English translations of the World War II sections of Japanese history textbooks, should examine what is in the Japanese books.

1) The Kanghwa Incident and the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty

The first incident to be discussed is the Kanghwa incident of 1875, in which according to Pratt (2006, 194) the Japanese warship Unyo conducted manoeuvres and surveys off the coast of Kanghwa-Do (an island currently under jurisdiction of Incheon City) in order to provoke Korean coastal batteries to attack them, so they could claim Korean belligerence. This was done in order to force Korea to the negotiating table, and a year later resulted in the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty. That treaty was unequal, in that it gave extraterritorial rights to Japan as well as opening three ports for trade. The textbooks all have slightly different depictions of the event. Fusosha does not mention the Kanghwa incident in the main text, but in a footnote on page 24 of Chapter 4 states “Following this incident [Korea's refusal to establish relations with Japan], Japan deployed a warship off Kanghwa Island in Korea in 1875 and put pressure on Korea by making surveys of the nearby coastline without permission. This resulted in the Japanese warship being bombarded, and an exchange of gunfire ensued (Kanghwa Incident).” Though this is a footnote, not the main text, it does clearly state that Japan was conducting a survey without permission. This wording seems to be actually perfectly fair to Korea, as it places Japan in a bad light. The only problem is that it was a footnote, not the main text, and therefore could be more easily ignored.

As for the Amity Treaty, that too is mentioned only the in the footnote, with the following wording: “For this reason [the Kanghwa Incident], Japan concluded the
Japan-Korea Amity Treaty in the following year in 1876, forcing Korea to open. This treaty was unequal for Korea. (Chapter 4, 24)” This does leave out a lot of details about the treaty, but it does at least state that Japan forced Korea to open, and that the treaty was unequal for Korea. Both of these mentions are fair to Korea, though the specific terms of the treaty are not specified. Again, the main issue is that this is in a footnote, and can therefore be easily missed.

Kyoiku at least mentions the Kanghwa incident in the main text, but only by saying “A year after the Kanghwa Incident... (Chapter 5, 17)” Just like Fusosha, the details are in a footnote stating “The incident in which a Korean fort bombarded a Japanese military vessel which had approached Kanghwa Island near Seoul in order to take soundings. The Japanese counter-attacked the fort and occupied the island.” Unlike Fusosha, the Kyoiku book makes the Japanese action seem acceptable, as there is no mention of the Japanese vessel lacking permission to take those soundings, so it seems like the Korean fort was overreacting.

The previously quoted sentence finishes with the following: “Japan deployed a mission commanding a military vessel to Korea and forced open the country with the signing of the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty. The conditions of this treaty were favorable to Japan (Chapter 5, 17).” This book also states that Japan forced Korea to sign the treaty, and that the treaty was unequal. However, using the phrase “favorable to Japan” has a softening quality that may be an attempt to mask the inequality of the treaty.

Nihon Bunkyo has this to say: “But in 1875, when a Japanese warship carrying out maneuvers and surveys off the coast near Hanseong (currently Seoul)
was bombarded (Kanghwa Incident)... (Chapter 4, 15)” Just as with the Kyoiku book, this book does not mention anything about the Japanese ship doing anything without permission, it merely states that the Japanese warship was bombarded.

That quote continues to say “the government used this as a pretext to carry out hard-line negotiations. In the following year, the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty was concluded and diplomatic relations were forcibly reopened. This treaty was unequal for Korea. (Chapter 4, 16)” Again, the use of the Kanghwa incident as a pretext is mentioned, and that the Amity Treaty was negotiated by force is also pointed out. Finally, this book too states that the treaty was unequal.

The Nihon Shoseki refers to the initial event simply as “Japan subsequently provoked the Kanghwa Incident. (Chapter 4, 16)” As can be seen, what happened is not considered important, only that the event happened. It should be pointed out that this book does state that Japan provoked the incident, however. Further, in a footnote it goes on to further elaborate on how the Japanese provoked the incident and actually gives the event surprisingly large coverage – but consigned to a footnote, where it may be ignored. The initial sentence continues “and used this as a pretext to pressurize Korea into concluding an unequal treaty (Japan-Korea Amity Treaty) with Japan, just like those that various Western countries had imposed on Japan. (Chapter 4, 16)” This book also emphasizes both that Japan had pressured Korea into the treaty and that the treaty was unequal. However, unlike the previous books, this book connects this event with Western countries' treatment of Japan, making the even sound somewhat worse.

Osaka has rather more detail: “In 1875, however, the government dispatched to Korea a battleship, which engaged in such provocative acts as surveying the coastline without permission. This culminated in an exchange of cannon fire between
the ship and the batteries on Kanghwa Island (the Kanghwa Incident). (Chapter 5, Section 1, 27)” Again, a Japanese textbook reaffirms Japanese provocation of the Kanghwa incident (and gives a little more detail).

Immediately after that passage, the text continues to talk about the treaty in this manner: “As a result of this incident, the following year Japan forced Korea to accept the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty, which included extraterritorial rights, and to open three ports, including Busan. Japan then commenced trade. (Chapter 5, 27)” Much as the other books so far, Osaka also says that Japan forced Korea to accept the treaty, though it does not say the treaty was unequal. Rather, the student must infer from the treaty's inclusion of extraterritorial rights that the treaty was unequal. It could be said that this makes the text slightly more pro-Japanese than the others, but it does not really take that much thought to realize that the treaty was unequal even given that wording.

Shimizu is also rather brief, stating “In 1875, Japan sent warships to the seas off Kanghwa Island on the pretext of surveying the area. When hostilities were exchanged... (Chapter 4, 25)” Interestingly, the text does not even name this 'the Kanghwa incident' but lets the reader infer this from a time line on the previous page that states “Kanghwa Incident” for the year 1875. This text does, however, corroborate the idea that the surveys were a pretext – though it does not mention that such surveying was not permitted by the Korean government. Again, however, the text is clear that Japan was the instigator.

To continue the sentence cut off in the previous paragraph, “Japan took advantage of the situation to force Korea into treaty negotiations, and in 1876 the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty was concluded. (Chapter 4, 25)” Note that this book does state that the treaty was forced on Korea, but does not in any way point out that it was
an unequal treaty – so this book may be considered more pro-Japanese than others.

The Teikoku book also agrees with Japan's responsibility for the incident, as it says “An incident occurred the following year [1875] in which Japanese military vessels were bombarded by Korea because they had taken soundings off the islands of Kanghwa without permission (the Kanghwa Incident). (Chapter 5, 26)” Again, there is the mention of Japanese fault, having acted without permission. The passage goes on to say “The new government used this as a pretext to force an unequal treaty, the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty, onto Korea and to force open their ports. (Chapter 5, 26)” It would appear that the Teikoku book agrees with all previous books that Japan forced the treaty onto Korea – but this book, like Shimizu, does not state that the treaty was unequal. So we now have two relatively pro-Japanese books.

The last book to be examined is the Tokyo book. It states “Japan negotiated with Korea to open up its borders, and in 1875, the Kanghwa incident... (Chapter 5, 20)” Tokyo merely mentions the incident by name and unbolded, but mentions in a footnote that “Japan applied pressure by dispatching a warship and surveying the Korean coast without permission.” So this book also points out Japanese fault for the incident, but only in a footnote. As for the treaty, continuing the previously quoted sentence from page 20, “led to the signing of a treaty (the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty) that recognized Korea as an independent nation and opened up the country. However, this treaty included unequal provisions forced on Korea by Japan.” In this case, while the book agrees with other books that the treaty was forced on Korea and was unequal, it is interesting that it includes one positive: that Korea was recognized as an independent nation. It seems that the Tokyo authors might be trying to soften the impact

Overall, it would appear that all the Japanese books agree that Japan forced
Korea to sign the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty. However, not all books even mention the Kanghwa incident, and those that do usually only include that information in footnotes, particularly Fusosha. Kyoiku and Nihon Bunkyo both do not state that Japan provoked the Kanghwa incident, though they do mention it – meaning that those books are relatively pro-Japanese. As for the treaty itself, only Kyoiku and Tokyo fail to mention that the treaty was unequal, though Kyoiku does state that the treaty was favourable to Japan. In any event, it seems clear that all the books do point out that the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty was forced on Korea, and almost all point out its inequality. Interestingly again, the maligned Fusosha book does in fact mention Japan’s fault – though it could perhaps be called out for not putting the information in the main text, but in more easily ignored footnotes.

It is now time to look at the Korean textbooks, and see what they have to say. To begin with, this paper will look at the Jung (Middle School) book. The first quotation shall be: “Japan both asked and forced the Joseon King to open new negotiations . . . which led to the Unyoho Incident (1875). This incident led to Joseon being forced to sign the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty. This case was an example to Western countries on how to suppress Asian countries. (197)” As with the Japanese books, and as to be expected, this text plays up that Korea was forced to sign the Amity Treaty. Interestingly, it also notes that this incident served as an example to Western countries, which is probably hyperbole, since it seems that Western countries already knew how to suppress various Asian countries.  

This is followed by some text on the Kanghwa-Do Treaty itself, as follows:

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6 In Korean books, the Kanghwa Incident is termed the “Unyoho Incident” after the name of the Japanese ship.

7 In addition, it is sometimes argued that Japan decided on this course of action because Western powers had forced the same kinds of treaties on Japan previously – thus Japan was merely following the Western precedent.
“Japan dispatched warships to Kanghwa-Do to intimidate Korea into having treaty negotiations with them. The Joseon Government was against talking with Japan because they claimed that Japan's actions were barbaric and invasive. (197)” Notice both that the wording is that Japan was “intimidating” Korea, and most importantly that Joseon claimed that Japan was being “barbaric and invasive.” While the intimidation appears to be quite true, reporting that Japan's actions were barbaric and invasive, even though it may be exactly what the Joseon government said, does imply that that is the correct view, and thus Korean students are being given reason to despise Japan. Later on the book also states “The Kanghwa-Do Treaty clearly stated Joseon's autonomy, but the treaty included some articles that were unfair. This treaty was a representative case of Joseon giving Japan the right to survey the land and seas and extraterritorial rights that allowed Japanese people to follow Japanese law in Joseon. (198)” In this case, the book is actually very similar to the Japanese books in general, noting that the treaty was unequal (or in this case unfair). While unfair does sound worse than unequal, it is a small difference. As is to be expected, in the quotation, and in the paragraph surrounding it, more detail is included about the treaty itself than is in the Japanese books (though that detail was not quoted).

Next up, the Godeung book gives only a very brief summary of this, much less than the other three Korean texts. As it states “the Japanese had an eye on invading Korea which caused the Unyoho incident. At that moment, Korea and Japan signed the Kanghwa-Do Treaty, which opened the country's doors (1876). . . However, Busan and two other ports were opened and Japan got extraterritorial rights and the right to conduct a coastal survey, which were uncomfortable points of the treaty. (108)” This extremely brief overview is in contrast with the other Korean textbooks, but more in line with the Japanese books, which often put information
about the Kanghwa-Do Treaty in a footnote. It should be noted that this book talks about Japan having an eye on invading Korea, which is somewhat inflammatory. On the other hand, it is interesting that this book does not call the treaty unfair or unequal, but merely “uncomfortable.” It describes the other treaties concluded with Western powers the same way – so perhaps this book is trying hard to be fair?

The Jungang book leans pretty far into anti-Japanese territory. As it says, “The Kanghwa-Do Treaty was the first treaty signed by our country on the basis of modern international law. However, it seems unlikely that the negotiators knew much about modern international diplomacy because the treaty contained some thoroughly unequal clauses.

Following Japan's carefully planned invasion of Korea, the treaty of Kanghwa-Do (Korea-Japan Amity Treaty) was signed (1876). The Japanese treaty document clearly stated Korea's independence, and was intended to eliminate interference by the Qing by repudiating Korea's traditional relationship with the Qing... Those Japanese who committed crimes in the ports did not have to obey the laws, they had extraterritorial rights that permitted them to use Japanese courts. This article also excluded prostitution as a crime to protect their purpose to start invasive activities.

In these ways, the Kanghwa-Do Treaty infringed upon Korean sovereignty more than other unequal treaties as the Treaty went beyond normal political and military objectives since the Japanese invaded normal trade and had greater economic purposes. In the past, Japan had signed unequal treaties with the USA and England, among others, and now they forced a similar treaty on Korea. (48)”

A great deal is quoted because this book is more detailed than any other, and
it does have a great deal of information that can be seen as very anti-Japanese. To begin with, it talks about a “carefully planned Japanese invasion.” Later, it singles out prostitution as being excluded as a crime, and that is linked to the Japanese wanting to start invasive activities. This seems to be a bit of leap in logic, and also this information was not included anywhere else, which raises questions as to the truth of that statement. Finally, the Kanghwa-Do Treaty is said to infringe upon Korean sovereignty more than the other unequal treaties, which again makes Japan look worse – and also it seems doubtful that that particular treaty went farther than any other. Rather, it could be said that the treaty started the process that led to the Japanese colonization. The treaty itself does not really go farther than other unequal treaties signed by Korea and Western powers, or even Japan and Western powers – though that too is mentioned, which is a balancing measure. It is also interesting that the first paragraph mentions that the Korean negotiators did not understand international law – which serves to make Korea seem more naive or innocent. On the other hand, this is the only book that does not mention that Korea was forced into the treaty.

The last book is the Geumsong book. This book is also quite brief in its examination of these events. Witness: “Meanwhile, Japan took a new approach in penetrating Korean politics by siding with Heungseon Taewongun’s new political movement. The Korean government also set up feelers in Japan, as it was interested in getting information about the West indirectly. The Unyoho [Kanghwa-Do] incident in 1876 was used by Japan as a heavy-handed excuse to force open Korea's doors. The Joseon government discussed the pros and cons, but eventually the Kanghwa-Do Treaty (Korea-Japan Amity Treaty) was concluded, opening up the country (50).”

Interestingly, this book states that Japan was trying to gain influence in Korea
by siding with the Taewongun, which is not noted in any other book, and also that Korea was trying to get information on the West through Japan at the same time. This book also does not state that Korea was forced into the Kanghwa-Do Treaty, which is somewhat surprising. On the other hand, it does call the Kanghwa-Do Incident a “heavy-handed excuse to force open Korea's doors.” Overall, while this book is not detailed, it also is not objectionable.

The overall picture is that most of the Korean books are actually no more detailed than the Japanese books on the Kanghwa Incident and Kanghwa Treaty. The major difference is that the Japanese books tend to only mention the treaty was signed, and put all the details into a footnote, whereas the Korean books put this into the main text. The actual level of detail tends to be similar, and both countries put the blame on Japan for these events, which seems unquestionably true. However, the Jung (Middle School) book calls the Japanese action “barbaric and invasive” while the the Jungang books constantly mentions Japan's careful plans to dominate Korea and even says that the Japanese did not consider prostitution a crime and that that was somehow a part of its invasion plans. Those two books could stand to be rewritten in a more conciliatory tone – in particular the Jungang book. The Jungang book should probably remove the prostitution reference, as no other source mentioned that, and it stretches credibility that that would factor into any invasion plans Japan might have had. Excepting that, it is actually remarkable how similar the Japanese and Korean textbooks are on these events.

2) The Imo Mutiny and the Kapsin Coup

The Imo mutiny occurred in 1882 and was a mutiny by various army units in Seoul mutinied due to their going unpaid for some length of time. According to Pratt
(2006, 180), “with Japanese support the Taewongun [the former regent of King Kojong] took advantage of the turmoil to stage a coup against his daughter-in-law [Queen Min] . . . Kojong asked his father [Taewongun] to take charge, but the Chinese government also moved fast. . . it now embarked on a face-saving attempt to rescue a little traditional influence of its own by reasserting it supposed droits de seigneur in Korea. Three thousand of its soldiers arrived. The Taewongun was taken prisoner and hauled off to China. Queen Min returned to the palace, and in September Kojong, with a public apology for the upheaval, promised the country a fresh start.” Note that this Western book does not explain what support the Japanese gave the Taewongun, but it makes it quite clear that the mutiny quickly turned into an excuse for Qing China to try and demonstrate its strength by intervening. As can be inferred, this period of Korean history is marked by Chinese and Japanese rivalry being contested within Korea's borders.

The Kapsin coup, like the Imo mutiny is named after the year the event occurred according to the old Korean calendar, 1884. In the Kapsin coup, Kim Ok-kyun, So Jae-Pil, and other members of a reform-minded political party plotted a coup d'etat in order to force Korea to reform and modernize in a manner similar to Japan. According to Pratt, “Hong Yongsik, director of the new Post Office, was hosting a dinner to celebrate its opening. As the distinguished guests were enjoying their meal a fire broke out, and amid the confusion men rushed in with swords, killed Hong and badly injured Min Yongik . . . the head of the Min clan [the most powerful clan in Korean politics at the time] and the queen's nephew . . . [and an] uproar engulfed the capital. King Kojong found himself in the Japanese legation, which had advance warning of the plot and approved the move against the pro-Chinese leadership. Some say he fled there, other that Japanese guards took him there.
Whichever, it was the very next day he announced a new, reform-orientated government. Straight away Chinese troops intervened to ensure that it was virtually still-born. (180)” This fails to mention that the Chinese troops fought with Japanese troops at the Japanese legation, which was burned down. In the aftermath, Kim Ok-kyun and other important coup leaders escaped by boat to Japan from Chemulpo [now Incheon]. King Kojong was captured by the Chinese forces and returned to the palace. Later, Li Hongzhang of China and Ito Hirobumi of Japan signed the Convention of Tianjin, which made both countries pull their troops out of Korea, asked King Kojong to hire a third country to train Korea's army, and also forced either country to inform the other before they sent new forces into Korea. As can be seen, this event was also a case of Korean politics being manipulated by both Japan and China, though Japan could been seen as being the more provocative party in this case, since they had foreknowledge of the coup attempt and approved of it. It seems fair to assess the Imo Mutiny as being entirely of Korean origin, though Japan was not against it, as there seems to be no other source agreeing with Pratt's contention that Japan assisted in any way. The blame here would appear to lie more with Qing dynasty China, or perhaps especially Yuan Shikai, the Chinese envoy to Korea. The Kapsin coup can be blamed on Japan because though the instigators were all Korean, Japan knew about and approved of the coup attempt. Now let us see what the Japanese textbooks have to say about the two incidents.

Let us begin with Fusosha. For the Imo mutiny it records “in 1882 (Meiji 15), a number of Korean military men who were unsatisfied with being left out of the reform measures and for being treated coldly instigated riots (Imo Mutiny). The Qing took advantage of this situation by dispatching several thousand soldiers to suppress these riots thereby weakening Japan's influence in the region. (Chapter 4, 37-38)” As
can be seen, in the Fusosha book, the mutiny is portrayed as being completely Korean in origin and was then seized upon by the Qing as a way to weaken Japan's influence. Of greater interest is that nothing about Taewongun, King Kojong, or Queen Min is mentioned in connection with the event – it is merely an event that increased Qing power at the expense of Japan. If anything, the Qing look bad while Korea and Japan come out okay.

As for the Kapsin coup, the book states “In 1884, Kim Ok-kyun and others who had been inspired by the Meiji Restoration and were seeking modernization carried out a coup d'état. This coup, however, was once again suppressed by the Qing army (the Kapsin political coup). (Chapter 4, 38)” The next paragraph goes on to say “Japan, having failed twice in its struggle with the Qing dynasty over Korea, expanded its military preparations in expectations of a war with the Qing. (Chapter 4, 38)” In this case, the book does not mention anything about Japan knowing or approving of the coup, but makes it seem that Kim Ok-Kyun and his followers acted alone. In this case, the book can be blamed for not mentioning that Japan had advance knowledge and approved of the coup, because that makes it appear that only the Qing dynasty was intervening in Korean politics. However, the next sentence talks about Japan's struggle with the Qing over Korea, which implies that Japan and Qing both wanted more power over Korea – so at least the book does show that Korea was being victimized, but both by China and Japan. In any event, while the book could go farther in mentioning Japanese complicity with the Kapsin coup, the book does imply that Korea was the prize both Japan and China wanted, and treated as little more than a pawn by both those powers.

On a completely different tack, there is the Kyoiku book, which does not mention either the Imo Mutiny or the Kapsin Coup. Rather, it merely states “Japan,
which sought to expand its influence into Korea, came into deeper confrontation with Qing China, which was also seeking to strengthen its control over Korea. At the behest of Qing, who hoped to restrain Japan, Korea established diplomatic ties with Western countries. Korea also took steps to modernize, but they were unsuccessful due to Japanese and Qing interference. (Chapter 5, 25)” As previously mentioned, no specifics are given in this text, rather the text emphasizes the overall pattern of Korea being treated as a pawn by both Qing China and Japan. On the positive side, this text too points out that Japan was attempting to expand its influence in Korea and that Japan was meddling with Korea's internal affairs. However, it does not say what Japan did specifically, though that is balanced by the lack of detail on Qing. In addition, the book does point out that Qing China was doing the same as Japan, which could be seen as an excuse for Japanese behaviour. If Qing could do it, why not Japan? In any event, Kyoiku definitely does not win points for detail.

If the Kyoiku book would fail to win points for detail, the Nihon Bunkyo book would likely be penalized. No mention is made of Korea after the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty and before the Tonghak Rebellion. Therefore, it is safe to say that this book is very insular and concerned almost entirely with domestic Japanese developments. As such, this book can be blamed for not educating students about events outside Japan, even in its close neighbours Korea and China.

The Nihon Shoseki book is truer to the spirit of the Kyoiku book, mentioning the broad trend without actually referring to either the Imo Mutiny or Kapsin Coup. Rather, its states “After forcing an unequal treaty on Korea, Japan made use of the favorable terms of the treaty to gradually extend its influence in Korea. Opposition to Japan's ambitions mounted in Korea. Taking advantage of divisions within the Korean court, Japan formed an alliance with those forces that were looking to Japan
for support. However, Japan failed in its attempt to eliminate Chinese influence, and hostility between Japan and China intensified. (Chapter 4, 31)” As can be seen, no mention of those two incidents occurs, though the passage does point out that Japan was trying to increase its influence in Korea against the wishes of many Koreans. Further to that, it also alludes to the poor position of Korea at that time by pointing out both the divisions in the Korean court and by pointing out the rivalry between China and Japan over Korea. At least it can be said that this book does point out that Japan was taking advantage of the situation to gain influence over Korea, and that Korea was being fought over by China and Japan.

In the same vein, Osaka also does not directly refer to these incidents, but contents itself with saying “After concluding the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty, the Korean government switched to progressive modernization policies. However, as there were also powerful forces that opposed these progressive policies, and because Japan and China were apt to interfere in Korean politics, Korea suffered from internal instability. (Chapter 5 Section 1, 40)” This passage is interesting because unlike the rest, it makes it appear that Korea was really trying to modernize, but internal problems as well as the actions of Japan and China were responsible for the failure of that. This is unusual because the other passages either do not mention Korean development or connect it with Japanese involvement. In that sense, this is perhaps the most pro-Korean of all the passages. However, like all the rest up to now save Fusosha, this passage lacks detail.

This trend is somewhat reversed in Shimizu, where the passage goes “However, that same year [1882], the old military joined forces with the conservative faction and staged a rebellion. China sent its forces to quell the revolt, supporting the opening policy. Then, in 1884, a group of Koreans who had studied in Japan and had
come to favor radical reform launched a coup d'etat, counting on support from Japan. However, this rebellion was also suppressed by the Chinese army. This incident raised tensions between China and Japan, but the following year, both countries withdrew their forces from Korea, and tensions eased. China then sent influential politicians to Korea and interfered heavily in domestic policies there. Since Japan was militarily weaker than China at that time, the Japanese government decided to exercise restraint in its intervention in Korea. (Chapter 4, 40-41)” As can be seen, the Imo Mutiny and Kapsin Coup are referenced in this quotation, though neither event is actually named. It should be noted that China appears to be the main target of blame in this passage, as the book notes that the Chinese army suppressed the mutiny and the coup. Further, it points out that China “interfered heavily in domestic politics (Chapter 4, 41)” in Korea. So China is given most of the blame. The text does state that Japan “decided to exercise restraint in its intervention in Korea (Chapter 4, 41),” meaning that the text also does mention that Japan was planning to intervene in Korea, but was stymied by China. While Japan does not come off as blameless, the book does give China more of the blame. While this contention is debatable, this author would tend to agree with this particular textbook – as supported by the Pratt excerpt quoted earlier.

Teikoku reverts to the usual standard and omits any detail of the events, but instead states “Following the example of the western nations, Japan considered extending its influence into the Korean peninsula. After the Kanghwa Incident, Japan had been seeking an opportunity to dispatch troops to Korea. This created a conflict with the Qing state, which viewed Korea as being within its sphere of influence. (Chapter 5, 41-42)” The important thing to note is that the book somewhat justifies Japan's actions by stating that Japan was following the west's lead. However, it also
points out that Japan had been planning to send troops to Korea since the Kanghwa incident, which does apportion blame to Japan. It should also be noted that this book again affirms the view shared across most of the textbooks that Korea was being used as a pawn by both China and Japan.

Finally, Tokyo gives slightly more detail than most, as can be seen in the following passage: “On the Korean Peninsula, meanwhile, a power struggle was taking place between Japan, which had concluded the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty with the Koreans, and the Qing rulers, which claimed suzerainty over Korea. The Koreans themselves were sharply divided between the pro-Japanese camp, which sought to modernize the country in emulation of the Meiji restoration, and the pro-China camp, which wanted to resist the West by maintaining its relationship with China. After the political upheaval of 1884, as China's influence grew, Japan began to build up its military with a view to countering China, convinced that, with the Western powers escalating their assault on East Asia, Japan's future would be bleak if it did not advance into Korea. (Chapter 5, 26)"

As can be seen, again, this text views Korea as being more of a prize for both Japan and China in the 1880s. Unlike others, however, this text places the most blame on the West. The use of the language “assault on East Asia” when referring to western imperialism leaves no doubt as to whom the textbook seeks to blame most. This could be viewed as also trying to rationalize Japan's actions by saying that if Japan didn't invade Korea, Japan would have been colonized like other Asian countries – note that the text also says that Japan was “convinced” that such action was necessary. One other item of note is that the page has a footnote explaining the Kapsin Coup as “The pro-Japanese faction joined forces with Japan to seize control of the government by force but was thwarted by the Qing government, and Japan's
influence was sharply diminished. (Chapter 5, 26)” The coup is not named, but this book says that Japan was a direct actor in the coup, which puts more blame on Japan than the other books. Overall, Tokyo seems to place blame on the West more than any other book, though it at least gives some blame to Japan as well.

The overall picture of the Imo Mutiny and Kapsin Coup is one of ignorance in Japanese textbooks. Interestingly only Fusosha, the much-maligned textbook, actually contains any detail on the Imo Mutiny and Kapsin Coup, and does place some blame on Japan for the Kapsin Coup, though the mutiny is portrayed as being more of domestic origin. Shimizu is next most detailed, referring to the events without actually naming them – however, most of the blame is given to China for both events. All the other books save one merely speak of that era being dominated by the rivalry of Japan and China for control of Korea, which does allow Korea the ability to be considered an innocent victim of Japan and China, but most blame is given to China for the events of the period, Japan taking a smaller share. This is naturally a debatable contention. Finally, there is one book, the Nihon Bunkyo, which contains no mention of anything to do with Korea between the Japan-Korea Amity Treaty and the Tonghak Rebellion. In general, it seems that Japanese books at least blame Japan somewhat for these events, but blame China more. It is also apparent that some books, most notably Tokyo, point the finger of blame at the west, and take the stance that Japan was emulating them in order to protect itself from them. So some improvements could be made on that front. Now it is time to see how the Korean textbooks stack up against the Japanese on this issue.

Now, the Jung book does not have much to say on the Imo Mutiny, but here it is: “While the country was promoting the Enlightenment Policy, the government treated the new-style army better than the old-style army, who were considered
relatively minor. The government didn't pay the old-style army on time for a long period, instead paying the soldiers in rice mixed with sand, so their anger spontaneously burst out. Those old-style soldiers killed some hated officers, attacked the Japanese Legation, and killed the Japanese military trainer of the new-style army. That was the Imo Mutiny. (200)” This book clearly depicts the Imo Mutiny as being of purely domestic origin, though the Japanese Legation was attacked and a Japanese trainer killed. Interestingly, the passage does not explain why they attacked Japanese targets, leaving the reader to conjecture. In addition, the taking of the Taewongun to China is also not mentioned.

The same book has quite a bit to say about the Kapsin Coup, however. “After the Imo Coup, Qing started to intervene in Joseon, and the Min clan, who retrieved the royal authority of Joseon, was passive about the Enlightenment Policy, so the reforms were discontinued. The Progressive Party was not satisfied with the Min clan because they wanted to rebuild the country like Japan who succeeded in building a modern country with the Meiji Restoration. So Kim Ok-Gyun and others of the Progressive Party started a coup during the opening ceremony of the new Post Office. This is called the Kapsin Coup. . . However the coup failed in just 3 days because of the Qing army and then Kim Ok-Gyun, Pak Yeong-Hyo, etc., went into exile in Japan.

The reason the coup failed was that the enlightenment movement was not propagated among the people of Joseon, so there was no support from the common people. The reason why they didn't support the progressive party was because the party tried to use the power of Japan, and the common people did not like that. Moreover, the last reason for the failure of the coup was that the army of Qing was larger and stronger than the Japanese army. (201)” Interestingly, the Kapsin coup is also presented as a completely domestic movement – no mention is made of Japan
having promised anything to the coup leaders. Also of interest is that the book claims that support for the Kapsin coup did not come from the common people because the common people didn't like that the Progressive Party worked with the Japanese. This implies a sense of nationalism that may or may not have existed at the time – whereas pragmatism might have been more commonplace.

The passage continues: “. . . Minister Yejo was dispatched to Japan to complain about Japan's assistance in the coup and to request Kim Ok-Gyun and other be returned to Joseon. However, Japan used its armed forces to force Kojong to give compensation to Japan for the burning of the Japanese Legation and the deaths of its officials at that time. The government made a new treaty, the Hanseong Treaty, and gave compensation to Japan.

Due to the failure of the Kapsin Coup, Japan made a treaty with Qing called the convention of Tianjin because they knew they were weaker than Qing politically. . . After the Kapsin Coup, Qing's intervention in Joseon became more serious. The two countries Qing and Japan competed in Joseon by reinforcing their economic invasion, which caused the Sino-Japanese War 10 years later. (202)”

This passage tells the reader that Joseon complained to Japan about Japanese assistance in the coup, which was not previously mentioned, and then about Japan forcing Joseon to give compensation for damages suffered during the coup. It goes on to mention that Qing interference in Korea became more pronounced after the coup. While no Japanese book mentions the first item, they do all speak of increased Qing interference in Korea. Again, we have a picture of similarity between the Japanese and Korean textbooks.

As for the Godeung book, it has little to say on the Imo Mutiny, just this: “during the process of promoting the enlightenment policy, old-fashioned soldiers,
members of the lower class, etc, who felt estranged from the policy avoided speaking. Due to this, a military insurrection arose in the year of the horse (임오군란) (1882). Thence, reinforcements were requested from the powerful Qing dynasty. When the Qing army entered Seoul, it seized power and took Heungseon Taewongun to China (109).” Like the Jung book, the Godeung book also states that the Imo Mutiny was a domestic affair, and points out that after the Qing troops were requested, they proceeded to take power away from the Koreans. Otherwise, this book gives very few details. However, it has more to say about the Kapsin Coup.

“After the Year of the Horse military insurrection, the Qing dynasty intensified its interference in Joseon domestic affairs and its economic aggression. Opposition leaders Kim Ok-Gyun (김옥균), Pak Yeong-Hyo (박영효), and other leftist supporters of the enlightenment policy, with the aid of the Japanese military, started the Kapsin coup (1884)...

However, the enlightenment faction's political power collapsed and ceased when the Qing army intervened after only 3 days. This was because the Kapsin coup's foundations in political and military circles was weak, and also because the coup chose to depend more on external factors than the people's support for success. However, the Kapsin coup is significant as it was the first political reform movement that aimed to establish a modern nation-state (109).”

Like the Jung book, the Godeung book also points out that the Kapsin coup was primarily a domestic situation. However, unlike the Jung book, the Godeung book states that the coup planners did receive aid from the Japanese military. Also unlike the Jung book, here the failure of the coup is attributed more to the coup's lack of support among the political and military leaders than due to the common people
rejecting the Japanese element. This makes the Godeung book a little more Japan-friendly. There is a bit more to quote from this section:

“After the Kapsin coup, the Joseon government thought that the Qing dynasty went too far in interfering with Joseon domestic administration. In order to free itself, Joseon strengthened its diplomatic relations with Russia. During this process, England, feeling anxiety about the expansion of Russia power, illegally occupied Geomun-Do (1885) (110).” This section is also valuable because while it too points out that the Qing were more to blame for the problems after the coup, it also points out other countries like England as targets for blame.

The overall judgement of this book is that it gives much less detail than the Jung book did, which is a little unusual considering that this book is meant for high school students while the previous book was meant for middle school students. Of greater importance to this paper, it seems that while the Godeung book does actually mention Japanese assistance to the Kapsin Coup, in all other ways it actually reads much more neutral than the Jung book does. In particular, this book points out the misdeeds of Qing quite clearly, and mentions the misdeeds of England as well. Overall, the Godeung book seems nearly as neutral on these events as the Japanese books do – in fact, some Japanese books blame Japan more than this book does!

The Jungang book is quite a bit more detailed on the Imo Mutiny, with a selected passage reading “for the 13 months prior to the mutiny, the old-style soldiers had not received their stipend.

In June 1882, corrupt officials embezzled the stipends of those soldiers who were paid in rice, worsening the situation. Kim Chun-Yeong and the old-style soldiers denied that they had received the rice, and so the chief of the command Min Gyeom-Ho imprisoned them.
The old-style soldiers then went out to Min Gyeom-Ho's house and destroyed it, causing him to go to the Taewongun for help. In addition, an arsenal of assault weapons was seized by the assault on the Uigeumbu police bureau, and the old-style soldiers who had been detained were released, along with some Confucian scholars. Also, the houses of government officials were raided, the Japanese Legation was attacked, and a Japanese teacher was killed. The Japanese Legation officials burned down the building themselves, and escaped to Japan via Jemulpo (59).”

This book agrees with the other Korean texts that the mutiny arose from domestic concerns, namely the old-style soldier going unpaid and corrupt officials embezzling funds. This book also points out that the Japanese Legation had been targeted by the mutineers. However, unlike any other book, and also unlike any other source this author has found, the Jungang book goes so far as to say that the Japanese burned down their own legation. This is quite clearly anti-Japanese, as when combined with the fact that Japan was given compensation by the Hanseong Treaty, it appears that Japan burned down its own legation in order to make Korea pay it compensation. This would be an interesting scheme, to say the least.

There is one other important sentence close to the end of the section on the Imo Mutiny that states the following: “However, the mutiny gave the Qing an occasion to dispatch their army, and they held Heungseon Taewongun responsible for the mutiny, took him into custody, and escorted him to Tianjin (59).” This sentence shows that the Qing was given the opportunity to dispatch their army, but in this book it does not say that the Qing seized power, as the Godeung book said. It also does not say that the Qing army had been requested to come, which is a bit more anti-Qing. Now, on to the Kapsin Coup.

“First, some members of the Progressive Party went to the Japanese and were
promised some military and financial support. . . Kim Ok-Gyun and the Progressive Party carried out the coup on October 1st, 1884, during a party celebrating the opening of the new Post Office. The people who formed the basis of the coup falsely informed the King that there had been a revolt and killed crucial people and leaders of the Min clan. The progressive party seized power and established a new government and published innovative new laws on behalf of the King.

In the early part of the coup, Yuan Shikai of the Qing was observing the situation before leading his troops and the King into Changdeokgung palace. With the dispatch of the Qing troops, the Japanese army withdrew; Kim Ok-Gyun and the others fled with the Japanese troops to the Japanese Legation, and then fled to Japan through Incheon. Meanwhile, after the news of the coup and the Japanese retreat from Changdeokgung, indignant citizens of Seoul flocked to the Japanese Legation and stormed it. When the Progressive Party regime collapsed, King Kojong organized a new government (62)."

As can be seen, the Jungang book gives a lot more detail on the Kapsin Coup than the earlier books did. Of particular note is that this text says that the Japanese promised both military and financial support to the coup planners. Also, Yuan Shikai and the Qing are given a lot more attention in this book. This book also does not give the impression that the Kapsin coup was a domestic trouble, unlike earlier books. However, it should be noted that the new laws laid down by the Progressive Party are called “innovative” in this book, perhaps to make the Korean protagonists look better. Finally, when the Japanese Legation is stormed, the book calls the Seoul citizens “indignant,” an example of an emotionally laden adjective being used for effect. The passage continues.

“Members of the party including Kim Ok-Gyun had warrants issued for their
arrest, and officials were dispatched to bring them back. Meanwhile, Japan sent 7 warships and 2 battalions of troops to Incheon, and demanded the payment of compensation for the Japanese Legation. In the end, Japan forced Korea to sign the Hanseong Treaty, and Japan received what it had requested.

Due to the failure of the Kapsin Coup, the Japanese, whose army was weakened by fighting with the Qing army, signed the treaty of Tianjin. . . Meanwhile, since the Qing's Yuan Shikai was still stationed in Korea, he still deeply intervened in Korea's internal affairs and diplomacy (63).”

In this passage, the important areas to look at are first that unlike any other book, this one mentions Japanese military buildup in addition to having forced Korea to sign the Hanseong Treaty. But it does point out that Qing, and in particular its Resident-General Yuan Shikai, intervened. It goes farther than most by saying that he “deeply” intervened.

The overall picture the Jungang book gives is a much more anti-Japanese, and in face, anti-foreign outlook than the previous Korean textbooks. Japan is blamed for burning down its own Legation for compensation, as well as the other misdeeds that are mentioned in other textbooks. Qing is also heavily blamed, but unlike other books, this one pins the blame squarely on Yuan Shikai, and not Qing in general. Finally, unlike other books, the Jungang book also mentions England's “illegal” occupation of Geomun-Do.

The Geumseong book gives the most detail of any on the Imo Mutiny, as this except shows: “:As the government promoted the enlightenment policy, discontent among the conservative scholars, old soldiers, and the lower classes in Seoul increased. Rice, beans, and grains did not make it up to Seoul as a part of the crop flowed out to Japan causing prices to increase, and in addition, the old army soldiers
complained that they were not paid properly due to preferential treatment for the new army soldiers.

In June, 1882, after 1 year of not receiving pay, and then only being given 1 month's salary in addition to rice mixed with sand, soldiers of the old army finally rioted. The city's lower classes joined in while the mutiny grew out of control. These people killed senior officers and Japanese military instructors and also attacked the Japanese legation. . . However, the situation changed due to Qing military intervention. The Qing received a request from the Min clan for troops, which were dispatched quickly. . .

From this time, the Qing army was stationed in Korea and became deeply involved in internal and foreign affairs. In addition, the Joseon-Qing Trade Agreement forced open Korea's waterways and its merchants were able to penetrate the Korean economy.

This economic penetration of the Korean merchant class hit the common people hard, and partly obscured the growing anti-Japanese sentiment. Meanwhile, Joseon and Japan signed the Jemulpo treaty, which paid compensation to Japan and recognized Japan's right to station troops to guard the Japanese legation (64).”

More than the other books, the Geumseong books links the Imo Mutiny to outside causes. In particular, it posits that a large part of Korea's crops were flowing out to Japan, and this was causing price increases. This may be true, although the point seems arguable. At any rate, this is the first book that actually explains why Japanese things were targeted in the mutiny. So it could be seen as somewhat anti-Japanese. On the other hand, also unlike other books, this one states that the Min clan was the specific entity that requested Qing troops, placing blame on the Min clan as well for the later events. This book might be read as being rather anti-Qing, because it
mentions increasing intervention by the Qing after the mutiny, and also the greater penetration of Korea's economy by Qing – to the point that anti-Japanese sentiments were being obscured by the Qing economic penetration.

As for the Kapsin coup, here is an excerpt of what the book has to say: “The radical Progressive Party established a new government after they killed some high officials at the opening ceremony of the new Post Office (1884). . . However, the Kapsin Coup was defeated in 3 days due to the intervention of the Qing army. . .

The radical Progressive Party didn't recognize the aggressive intentions of the Japanese, though they were even supported by the Japanese army, but they were not supported by the common people, which caused the Japanese invasion (67).”

As can be seen, for some reason the Geumseong book actually gives less detail on the Kapsin coup than the other books in spite of giving more detail than others on the Imo Mutiny. Of greater importance, this book gives more credit to the yangban and aristocracy than other books, and even mentions the Gabo Reforms at this point, while other books wait until much later to talk about that. Of greatest importance, it says that the Progressive Party did not realize Japan's “aggressive intentions,” while saying that the lack of support for the coup by the common people caused the Japanese invasion. That particular sentence is rather galling, both because it seems to make the Progressive Party members seem too naive, and because it makes a causal connection between the lack of support for the coup by commoners and the Japanese invasion. That really does sound like a major leap.

As far as these events go, the Japanese and Korean books differ widely. Many Japanese books do not mention either event or only refer to them in passing, preferring to concentrate on the overall sweep of history in that period. Those that do mention the events usually assign some blame to Japan but most to Qing. The Korean
books tend to assign more blame to Japan, though they typically give Qing the largest portion of the blame. Strangely, most of the Korean books do not mention the Taewongun being arrested by the Qing and brought to China, and none ever mention the Taewongun being sent back to Korea after that point. This is perhaps done to not make Qing look too bad – arresting a foreign head of state was (and still is) illegal. Of Korean books, the Jung and Godeung books are most similar to the Japanese books, while the Jungang and Geumseong books are more anti-Japanese. The Geumseong book is perhaps more purely anti-Japanese, whereas the Jungang book has a more widely anti-foreign feel to it. It seems that the Japanese books could be improved by putting more detail in. The Korean books could be improved by using less emotionally-charged adjectives and also Jungang in particular should remove the clause where Japan burns down its own legation for no apparent reason in the text – it is only this author's assumption that the book means to imply that Japan intended to use the burning as a way to demand reparations from Korea.

3) The Tonghak Revolt and the Sino-Japanese War

The Tonghak Revolt broke out in 1894 in the southwestern region of Korea, also known as the Jeolla province. The Tonghak movement was a religious movement that initially preached equality of all people and was fighting to end abuses of the peasantry by the yangban, the aristocratic class of Korea. These abuses generally centred on over taxation and forced labour. Due to terrible conditions in the early 1890s, Tonghak adherents started a rebellion that was aimed initially at eliminating such abuses, but later took on a more anti-foreign (particularly anti-western and anti-Japanese) slant. This rebellion at its high point controlled virtually all of the Jeolla province and a good part of the Chungcheon province as well. As
Pratt (2006, 181) states, “government forces failed to suppress the rebels, and when Cheonju fell on 31 May, Seoul called a truce and appealed to Beijing for assistance. Li Hongzhang, following advice from Yuan Shikai, dispatched 1,500 Chinese troops, and in accordance with the Tianjin Treaty informed Tokyo that he was doing so ‘to restore peace to our tributary state’. . . Ito Hirobumi’s government now lost no time in ordering 7,000 of its own soldiers to Korea. In fact, any intervention proved to be uncalled for. The Tonghak rebels quickly dispersed.’” Pratt fails to mention that the rebels dispersed only after publishing a list of demands, which the government was unable to meet owing to the presence of the Chinese and Japanese troops, and the attendant interference with the Korean government. The rebels regrouped a few months later, when news came out that a pro-Japanese government had been established in Seoul. The rebels were wiped out by a combination of government and Japanese troops in the vicinity of Gongju, Chungcheongnam-Do in October, ending the rebellion. Meanwhile, tensions between the Japanese and Chinese, neither of whom wanted to evacuate Korea while the other was there, sparked the Sino-Japanese War. This paper will not cover that war, because its prime actors were Japan and China, not Korea, though Korea was a major theatre of war. At any rate, the outcome of the rebellion and the Sino-Japanese war that it inadvertently sparked, was the Treaty of Shimonoseki between China and Japan in which China renounced any claim to Korea. In effect, Korea became a truly independent state (as opposed to a tributary state of China) for the first time in centuries. Sadly for Korea, this state of affairs was not to last long.

In contrast to the description given above, the Japanese books typically report little on the Tonghak Rebellion, as will be seen shortly. The Fusosha book reports “in 1894 (Meiji 27), a mutiny called the Kogo Peasant War occurred in the south of
Korea. The peasant army sought to expel foreigners and corrupt officials and at one point even gained complete control over a portion of the Korean peninsula. The Korean kingdom, which had limited number of soldiers, asked the Qing to send forces to suppress the mutiny. Japan dispatched soldiers as well, using its agreement with the Qing as a pretext [the aforementioned Convention of Tianjin]. The Japanese and Qing armies clashed, resulting in the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. In 1895 (Meiji 28), Japan and the Qing signed the treaty of Shimonoseki, in which the Qing acknowledged the independence of Korea and paid an indemnity of 300 million yen (200 million taels). (Chapter 4, 38)” It should be noted that the Japanese terminology for the Tonghak Rebellion is a bit different from the English, and so it is called the Kogo Peasant War. Of greater importance, notice that the text points out that the peasants wanted to rid Korea of foreigners, but does not single out Japanese as a group of foreigners the Tonghak adherents wanted to expel most. On the other hand, the book acknowledges that Japan used the Convention of Tianjin as a mere pretext in order to send troops to Korea, which directly led to the the Sino-Japanese war. Overall, the book appears balanced, though the reporting on the rebellion itself is quite minimal.

Kyoiku reports things a bit differently - “in 1894, farmers in the south of Korea who were followers of a religion called Tonghak rose up in rebellion, demanding the reform of politics and the expulsion of Japanese and Westerners (the Kogo Peasant War⁸). When the Korean government asked the Qing to dispatch reinforcements, Japan responded by sending its own soldiers as well, and in 1894 the Sino-Japanese War broke out. The War ended in Japan's victory. In 1895, a peace

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⁸ This is the typical Japanese term for the Tonghak Rebellion, probably taken from the Korean name “Gobu” (now a part of Jeongeup, Jeollabuk-Do) for the place the rebellion first arose.
treaty was concluded in Shimonoseki (the Treaty of Shimonoseki) in which China accepted the independence of Korea. Japan's influence in East Asia expanded as a result of its victory in the Sino-Japanese War and some Japanese felt a sense of superiority or discriminatory feelings toward China and Korea. (Chapter 5, 25)"

Kyoiku is clearly less pro-Japanese than Fusosha in this passage, though the Tonghak Rebellion appears less significant in this book, as it does not mention the extent of the rebellion. Regardless, it does point out that the Tonghak rebels wanted the Japanese in particular to be expelled from Korea, along with Westerners. Japan also seems less justified in sending soldiers, both because the rebellion sounds less important, and because no mention is made of the Convention of Tianjin. In particular, the passage is notable because it points out Japanese feelings of superiority after the war, implying that the reader should be careful not to be so proud.

Nihon Bunkyo says the following: "In Korea in 1894, economic insecurity brought about by the opening of the country led the peasants to stage an uprising, demanding the expulsion of foreign interests and political reforms. The Korean government turned to China for military assistance in putting down the rebellion. Japan, seeking to assert leadership over Korea, sent a military force as well, and in August the Sino-Japanese War broke out, with Korea as the main theatre. Japan seized the Liaodong Peninsula and defeated the Chinese fleet, and a peace treaty (the Treaty of Shimonoseki) was concluded at Shimonoseki in 1895. In substance, the treaty called for China to recognize Korea's independence. The Sino-Japanese War was modern Japan's first foreign war, and its victory turned it into a major Asian power. While Chinese and Korean students began coming to Japan to study, the Japanese increasingly looked down on the Chinese and Korean people. (Chapter 5, 2-3)" Interestingly, this book even places blame for the Tonghak Rebellion solely on
foreigners, and places blame on Japan for sending troops to Korea. This book also fails to mention the Convention of Tianjin as the pretext, making it seem that Japan was sending troops purely to try and get more influence in Korea. Also, like the Kyoiku book, this book also points out that Japanese people were becoming prejudiced against Chinese and Korean people. Overall, this book too takes a very anti-Japanese stance.

Nihon Shoseki gives rather more detail than most others: “In 1894 Korean discontent with the government and with the incursions by Japan and the Western Powers boiled over, and a revolt took place, led by people who were adherents of Tonghak. Demanding political reform and the expulsion of foreign influence, the peasant army defeated the government army in all parts of Korea. The Korean government appealed to China for help in suppressing this rebellion, and Japan, which had been preparing for war with China, immediately dispatched troops to Korea.

By the time that Japan and China sent their troops, the peasant army and the Korean government had already reached a ceasefire. However, Japan presented the Korean government with a reform proposal that would enable Japanese military forces to remain in Korea. Displeased with the negative response that it received, Japan occupied Korea's royal palace. After attacking the Chinese navy, Japan then issued a declaration of war and started the Sino-Japanese War.

The war lasted for eight months and ended in victory for Japan. In 1895 a peace treaty was concluded in Shimonoseki. Under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, China recognized Korea's independence... In Korea, Japanese envoys assassinated
the Korean queen but failed to establish a Japan-friendly government. (Chapter 4, 31)"

This book clearly demonstrates that the Tonghak Rebellion arose as a consequence of both domestic and international matters, and interestingly paints a picture of an extremely strong rebel army. As the book puts it, the Tonghak army “defeated the government army in all parts of Korea (Chapter 4, 31).” Of course, this isn't really true as the rebellion was confined to the southern regions of Korea, but it helps explain why Korea asked for Chinese military assistance. Note that blame for the Sino-Japanese war is placed solely on Japan. The book points out that Japan had already been preparing for war, and that Japan did various other misdeeds, such as occupying the Korean palace. Also, this is the first book so far to mention the assassination of Empress Min of Korea, which was a great misdeed by Japan, and as such it is interesting that other books do not mention it. Perhaps the other books can be accused of “whitewashing” history – but Nihon Shoseki actually does mention this crime. So, it seems that Nihon Shoseki is the most pro-Korean book of the lot.

Osaka takes a step back with much less detail, as can be seen in the following: “in 1894 (Meiji 27), adherents of Tonghak joined forces with the peasants and took up arms in an attempt to banish foreign influences and bring about political reform. This was known as the Tonghak Rebellion. The Korean government requested that China send troops, and Japan, which had also been preparing for war, dispatched troops to Korea as well, in accordance with its treaty with China. This was the start of the Sino-Japanese War, which ended in victory for Japan, due to the modern army it had formed. The following year, a peace conference was held in

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9 This, the assassination of Empress Min is considered in Korea as one of the worst acts during the early years of Japan’s intervention in Korea, and is given much more space in Korean books, and even Western books on Korean history.
Shimonoseki (Yamaguchi Prefecture).

The **Treaty of Shimonoseki** was concluded at this peace conference. This treaty stipulated that China recognize Korea's independence . . . (Chapter 5, Section 1, 40)” This book agrees with Nihon Shoseki in that Japan had been preparing for war, and so gives Japan blame for the Sino-Japanese war. However, it does not mention as some books do how Japanese people became more prejudiced after victory in the Sino-Japanese war, and it also leaves out the assassination of Queen Min. So while it does not really praise Japan, it doesn't include some important points.

Shimizu has this to say: “In Korea, a rebellion by peasant followers of Tonghak broke out in 1894. The Korean government sought help from China, but when Japan learned of the rebellion it also sent in forces. Although the peasants reached a settlement with the Korean government, the Japan [sic] refused to withdraw its forces. It demanded reforms of the Korean government and began to wage war with the Chinese.

Defying the world's expectations, Japan defeated China in the **Sino-Japanese War**. The following year China promised to (1) recognize Korea's independence . . . (Chapter 4, 41)” While this book does no explain why the peasants rebelled, it also points out that Japan sent in forces unasked – like all the books do. This book does emphasize that Japan refused to bring its forces home, which also makes Japan look bad. But the problem with this book, like most others, is that it says nothing about either the effect on Japanese prejudices or the killing of Empress Min.

Teikoku holds a surprising amount of detail, witness: “At the time [the 1890s], the price of rice was continuing to rise in Korea as a result of heavy taxation, poor harvest, and excessive purchases by Japanese merchants who had arrived in the country after Korean ports had been opened. In these conditions, a rebellion broke
out in 1894 (Meiji 27), led mainly by farmers who were followers of a religion (Tonghak) that opposed Western culture. These rebels sought to drive out Japan and the Western powers and reform Korean politics. The peasant army defeated the government army and took control over southern Korea (the **Kogo Peasant War**).

The Korean government was no longer able to contain the peasant army and sought reinforcements from the Qing. Japan countered the Qing by immediately sending military forces to Korea. Although the peasant army and the Korean government had ceased fighting, Japan occupied the Korean royal palace and intervened in the country's internal affairs, leading to further conflict with the Qing. In July of 1894, the **Sino-Japanese War** began . . . Though Qing China was a great power, the Japanese military, armed with superior modern weaponry, triumphed.

A peace treaty was signed following the end of the war in Shimonoseki (Yamaguchi Prefecture) in April 1895. As a result, the Qing admitted the independence of Korea . . . (Chapter 5, 42)” What is very good about this book is the high level of detail. Also, Japan is given blame, as Japanese merchants are blamed (partly) for the high cost of rice in Korea. Since the Convention of Tianjin isn't mentioned, Japan has no stated excuse for sending troops. Actually, in general, Japan comes off badly in this book. But this book also does not mention Queen Min or effects of the war on Japanese attitudes.

Tokyo has a middling level of detail: “In Korea, political and economic chaos increased as Japan and China jousted for power. In these conditions, a widespread peasant rebellion rose up in the south, led by the folk-religion-based Tonghak movement and aimed at purging corrupt officials and expelling foreigners from the country (the Tonghak rebellion).

China and Japan both responded by sending armed troops to the Korean
Peninsula, and in August that year, the Sino-Japanese War broke out. Victory went to Japan, with its superior forces, and in April 1895 (Meiji 28) the two countries signed the **Treaty of Shimonoseki**. Under this document China agreed to (1) recognize Korea's independence . . . (Chapter 5, 27)” In this case, it seems that China is being given more blame than in other books. The political/economic problems are listed as being caused by the conflict between Japan and China. Further to that, the fact that Seoul asked China for help is omitted, making it appear that both China and Japan decided to send troops unasked for. So it is safe to say that the Tokyo book is probably the most pro-Japanese of the books, as it seems to blame China too much and Japan too little for the events described. It also avoids mentioning anything about Japanese attitudes and Queen Min's assassination. Overall, this is the worst of the bunch from a balanced-history perspective.

The overall level of detail given by the various books is fairly low, though Nihon Bunkyo, Nihon Shoseki, and Teikoku all have quite detailed overviews of both the Tonghak Rebellion and the Sino-Japanese War. The other books generally focus only on the Sino-Japanese War and just mention the Tonghak Rebellion in passing. Nihon Shoseki stands out for being the only book to mention the assassination of Queen Min by Japanese agents. This event is considered hugely important in Korea, and is also perhaps the most unforgivable act committed by Japan in Korea – but only one book mentions it. This is the first clear example of a major omission so far in the Japanese textbooks. Thus, one important recommendation this paper makes is that the Japanese books should all include the assassination of Empress Min in order to avoid accusations of whitewashing history. On the other hand, almost all the books do point out that Japan was at fault for sending troops to Korea unasked during the Tonghak Rebellion, which is a point in their favour. Also, several books do mention that
Japanese attitudes became more prejudiced after the Sino-Korean war, which is also something that should please other Asian people – though again, a recommendation would be to include that in all books. Tokyo might actually be the most unapologetic textbook, as it does not even mention that Qing forces were sent after Korea requested them – Tokyo makes it seem as though both China and Japan sent forces without Korean consent, which is interesting – and probably more misleading than anything else in any of the other books.

As for the Korean books, let us begin with the Jung book. As with the other Korean textbooks, the Tonghak Rebellion is given a great deal of attention. Here is an excerpt: “With the economic invasion and political confusion, the atmosphere in the countryside became more chaotic, and the chief of Gobu district, Jeollabuk-Do, Jo Byeong-Gap oppressed the peasants with his corruption. So Jeon Bong-Jun led the farmers in an attack on the government offices with the slogan “remove the corrupt officials and save the people!” . . . This was the beginning of the Tonghak Peasant Movement, the Gobu Peasant Revolt (1894) (208).” As can be seen, while foreign elements are indirectly blamed (the “economic invasion”), the focus of blame rests on one corrupt official. In addition, it was made clear that at that point, the Tonghak Rebellion aimed only to stop corruption internally.

Later, the text mentions that the Qing army was requested and the the Japanese sent their army also in response to the siege of Jeonju. Following that “after the Jeonju cease-fire, the peasant army dispersed, and the government asked the Japanese army to leave, however Japan refused to do so. The Japanese army took over a Joseon fortress and the Sino-Japanese War broke out. As the Japanese army invaded aggressively, the peasant army regrouped with the aim of killing or expelling the Japanese.
Advancing on Seoul, the peasant army fought fiercely against the Japanese army and the Joseon army at Ugeumchi in Gongju. However, they could not defeat the Japanese army, equipped with modern weapons, so they sacrificed many lives and fell back (209).”

For the most part, this book seems balanced enough. However, it should be noted that the book states only that the government asked the Japanese army to leave, and no mention is made of the Qing army at all, which leads one to question what the Qing army was doing. In addition, it could be argued that this book attempts to make the Tonghak peasants into martyrs, as it states that they fought fiercely and later that they “sacrificed many lives.” These word choices could be changed into something more neutral – although it appears reasonably certain that making the Tonghak Peasant Army into martyrs is precisely what the textbook is aiming for.

As for the Godeung book, it presents rather less information on the Tonghak Revolt. “Despite the Enlightenment Policy, the farmers were becoming more nervous and they were complaining more due to the Japanese economic invasion and the acceptance of foreign civilization and corruption in the government. . . The Tonghak Peasant Movement started in 1894 in Jeollabuk-Do, Gobu-Gun. The peasant groups led by Jeon Bong-Jun formed due to the corruption of Jo Byeong-Gap, the district chief of Gobu (110).”

This book could be construed as slightly more anti-Japanese at this point, because the previous book had merely mentioned foreign economic invasion, whereas this book specifically points out Japanese economic invasion. Further to that, the same sentence also appears to link that, the acceptance of foreign civilization, and corruption in the government as being all of a kind. In fact, those should be more clearly separated, as those are separate problems with separate causes – in particular,
the corruption problem was nothing new.

Continuing the passage a bit later, “as the Japanese army started to intervene, the peasant army regrouped and marched on Seoul to defeat the Japanese army. The Japanese army, armed with modern weapons, was dispatched in accordance with the Convention of Tianjin. The Japanese army defeated the peasant army at Ugeumchi in Gongju. . . The Tonghak movement was a reformation movement that was against the traditional system of government and also a counter-feudalism and counter-invasion movement (110).” As can be seen, this book uses much less emotional language than the Jung book, which is a good thing. Interestingly, the dispatch of the Japanese army is referred to as being “in accordance with the Convention of Tianjin,” which is surprisingly pro-Japanese sounding. In addition, this book points out more carefully that the Tonghak movement wanted to reform Korea in many ways, and was not simply an anti-Japanese movement. This aligns closely with what most of the Japanese textbooks say on the issue. One other item of note is the complete absence of any reference to the Qing army or the Sino-Japanese war. It also for some reason does not mention that the Joseon government army fought with the Japanese against the Tonghak rebels – perhaps to make the Joseon government seem better. In a sense, the Godeung book might be called the most insular of the Korean textbooks, little concerned with what happened in other countries.

Next comes the Jungang book. This book has a great deal more detail than the others, so only certain smaller excerpts of the whole will be quoted here. To begin with, “the Tonghak Peasant Movement started in Gobu as a peasant revolt. . . Jo Byeong-Gap was made chief of Gobu in 1892 and he forced people to pay more taxes by building Manseokbo and also mistreated people for the reason of making a memorial stele for his father . . . In January 1894 Jeon Bong-Jun lead 1000 people in
an attack on the government office (75).” As can be seen, this book credits only corrupt officials, particularly Jo Byeong-Gap, for the start of the revolt. This is interesting as the previous books had mentioned the economic invasion of foreign countries (or just Japan) as being part of the cause, whereas this book just credits corruption. The book then goes on to detail the growth of the revolt after that point and the siege of Jeonju.

At that point there is the important passage that goes “by the request of the Joseon government, the Qing army arrived at Asan harbour and the Japanese army arrived in Incheon due to the Convention of Tianjin. Due to this situation, the Tonghak Peasant Army requested that all foreign troops be withdrawn, and to abolish the Enlightenment Policy. This meant that there was no reason for the Qing and Japanese armies to stay in Korea (76).” In an improvement on the previous books, the Qing troops are mentioned, and even that they were requested to come. Interestingly, the book also makes it sound as though the Japanese army was also invited, which is somewhat surprising. However, the final sentence is rather odd, since it states that there was no reason for the foreign troops to be in Korea after the Tonghak rebels requested them to leave – if the government asked the troops to leave, that would make sense, but the book does not say that.

The final excerpt to be used states the following: “due to the Truce of Jeonju, the Qing and Japanese armies lost their excuse to stay in Korea . . . however the Japanese raided and captured Gyeonbokgung [palace] in June 1894, and after winning the Sino-Japanese War, Japan strengthened its intervention with the Korean government, and the Japanese and Korean armies began to suppress the Tonghak Peasant Army.

In the face of the Japanese intervention in Korea and the occupation of
Gyeongbokgung, the Tonghak Peasant Army restarted the war to drive out the Japanese Imperial Forces (September 1894) (77)."

The first sentence makes more sense than the previous excerpt did, as this time the Truce of Jeonju is mentioned as a reason why there was no excuse for the foreign armies to remain in Korea. As for the rest, it is pretty clear that Japan was in the wrong, and the events recounted are supported by other sources. Impressively, this book also tends to avoid overly emotional terms. The overall effect is that this book is more detailed than others, but it only uses well-documented events and generally avoids too much emotional language.

The last book is the Geumseong book, which also gives a great deal of detail on the Tonghak Rebellion, as the following demonstrates: “The tyranny of the chief of Gobu country made Jeon Bong-Jun lead a march of hundreds of farmers to the Gobu district office (January, 1894). They occupied the district office to punish the officials for their oppression. . . [much later] in this part of the revolt, more peasants participated than just Tonghak believers. They asserted revising the tax system and killing corrupt officials (79).”

As can be seen, there is a lot of detail on the activities of the peasant army. Much as the Jungang book, this book too mentions only the corruption of officials as the reason the revolts started. Later, it mentions that the Qing army was requested to come, and much like the previous books, that Japan sent its army too in accordance with the Convention of Tianjin. Later on, the book continues “after the peasant army reconciled with the government, they insisted that the Qing and Japanese armies go back to their own countries, however the Japanese army tried to utilize the chance to take over Gyeongbokgung by expelling the Qing army. The Japanese army occupied Joseon in order to incite the Sino-Japanese War . . .
Even though the peasant army strongly resisted the Japanese and government army, they lost at Ugeumchi in Gongju while on route to Seoul. . . the first attempt to reform by the peasants failed, but the Tonghak Peasant Movement burned so brightly that many farmers were affected in social reform movements later (82).”

This book, by using the term insist, takes a slightly more hard-line approach for the Tonghak. Previously, they “asked” whereas here they “insisted.” This implies a position of greater power for the Tonghak rebels, or alternately, that they were less polite. This book also includes the information about the raid on Gyeongbokgung, which is an important touch. Strangely, it also states that the Japanese army occupied Joseon in order to incite the Sino-Japanese War, which may be possible, but seems a bit too far-reaching. That the Sino-Japanese War started as an accidental byproduct of the Tonghak Rebellion, as stated by Pratt, is probably more believable.

Interestingly, the coverage of the Tonghak Rebellion in the books of both countries is relatively similar. In fact, the Japanese books tend to put more emphasis on anti-Japanese or anti-foreign sentiment than the Korean books do. Both countries' books do blame Japan for sending troops to Korea, though Japanese books usually say that the Convention of Tianjin was used as a pretext while the Korean books tend to say that the troops were sent in accordance with the Convention. The implication here is that the Japanese books actually blame Japan more than the Korean books do!

However, only one of the Japanese books mentioned the raid on Gyeongbokgung, whereas two of the Korean books did. That is a bit of an oversight on the Japanese side – though if Korean books also do not report it, it is perhaps more forgivable. Suggestions for changes would be that more Japanese books include the raid on Gyeongbokgung, since that was an important reason for the continuation of the rebellion. In addition, while Korean books mention this event much later, the
assassination of Empress Min should really be included in all the Japanese books. As for Korean books, those, particularly the Jung book, should try to avoid using so many emotional words – it seems quite clear that the use of emotional words is an attempt to force an emotional response, whereas more objective terms would not provoke such potentially dangerous responses.

4) The Samil Independence Movement

After President Woodrow Wilson of the USA declared at the Paris Peace Conference that all nations had a right to “national self-determination” in January 1919, as one of his famous “fourteen points,” Korean students and nationalist groups took notice. On March 1st (samweol ilil in Korean, hence the same “samil”), 1919, a group of Korean nationalists in Seoul signed a declaration of independence, a copy of which was sent to the Governor-General’s office. Then, in Pratt's words (2006, 217 – 218), “at 2 p.m. the same day, in Pagoda Park, a teacher read it again to a large crowd waving the Korean flag and singing the national anthem aegukka. Then, as they took to the streets shouting Manse! (‘Long live [Korea’]), the mood turned nasty. The 33 signatories were arrested, their plea for non-violence went unheeded, and the police response as they struggled to contain the uprising was brutal. Contemporary reports, smacking of hyperbole [this paper’s italics] as such things inevitably do, told of suspects rounded up and imprisoned... entire villages massacred. Order was restored by May, but students went on fanning the flames into a wider resistance movement and over the next twelve months estimates of casualties rose to 7, 645 dead and 45, 562 wounded.” While the Japanese crushed the movement, the death toll was high,

10 On the topic of assassinations, a future study might wish to compare how the textbooks record the assassination of Ito Hirobumi, first Resident-General of Korea by a Korean nationalist in Harbin, China.
which signalled to Japan that a new way of handling Korea was necessary, and so Japan replaced its Governor-General and changed its policies to mitigate the more objectionable parts of its rule. Now, let us see what the Japanese books have to say.

Fusosha states “In Korea, which was under Japanese rule, people gathered in Seoul for the funeral of the former King on March 1st 1919, and staged a demonstration procession. They declared Korean independence, shouting “Long live independence!” This movement soon spread through the rest of Korea (the Samil Independence Movement). The Government-General of Korea suppressed this movement, but it later changed its method of controlling the country through the use of force. (Chapter 5, 6)” As can be seen, not much detail is in this passage. The book mentions Wilson's fourteen points speech earlier and its effect on Asian nationalist groups, and that is tied directly with the Samil Movement, which does explain the reason and timing of the movement. The real issue with this is that it states that the movement was suppressed by the Government-General, but it does not include the death/injury toll or even mention that people were killed or injured, which makes it seem like the movement was somehow peacefully suppressed. Here is another example of “whitewashing,” since it appears that Japan did not resort to violence to put down the movement – but since Japan did, it is important to include that in the textbook. This is a major problem, and one that could explain the bad press the Fusosha book has received.

Kyoiku goes in a different direction by saying “In the Japanese colony of Korea, the independence of Korea was declared on March 1st, 1919, in Keijo (now Seoul). The independence movement, characterized by demonstrators shouting “Long live independence!” in the streets, spread through Korea (the Samil Independence Movement). This movement was calm and nonviolent, but Japan cracked down on
the demonstrators with military and police force. In response, the people of Korea rose up and the independence movement spread throughout Korea and even into Manchuria. Frequent demonstrations and protests continued until May. (Chapter 6, 6)” This book is notable for making Japan completely in the wrong – even Pratt notes that the movement's mood “turned nasty,” thus provoking a more heavy-handed response. In this book's case, there is no excuse for Japanese actions. While there is still no mention of deaths/injuries, the fact that military force was used implies that people would be injured or killed. This could be improved by including that statistic, but from a subjective standpoint, by saying the movement was nonviolent and Japan cracked down with military force should suffice to show that Japan was completely in the wrong. This book is clearly quite pro-Korean on this issue.

Nihon Bunkyo is also pro-Korean as the following quotation shows: “In Korea as well a movement for national independence and freedom sprang up. On March 1st, 1919, a declaration of independence was issued in Seoul. This sparked an independence movement that spread throughout the country (the Samil Independence Movement). Japan used the military and the police to suppress the movement by force, leaving about 8,000 dead and about 16,000 wounded. The independence movement continued, however, and Japanese rule was undermined. (Chapter 5, 22)” This book does not state that the movement was nonviolent, but it does still point out that the movement was suppressed by force. And, unlike the previous ones, this book actually does include casualty figures, which means that this book should be pleasing to the Korean side. Also, this book along with Kyoiku does not mention that Japan made some efforts to alleviate the worst parts of their rule as a result of the movement. Clearly, neither of these books is trying to whitewash Japanese history.

Nihon Shoseki follows in the footsteps of the previous two books by stating
the following: “Since the annexation of Korea, the Koreans had been suffering under the yoke of Japanese colonial rule, and they too rose up and demanded independence. On March 1st, 1919, while the Paris Peace Conference was in progress, a crowd assembled in a Seoul park to proclaim Korea’s independence, declaring that it was the natural right of the Korean people and that Korean independence was necessary for peace in the East. They then staged a demonstration, shouting “Long live independence!” This triggered the spread of the independence movement throughout Korea, and demonstrations continued for the next three months (the Samil Independence Movement). A total of 2 million people joined the movement, which demonstrated both at home and abroad the force of the Korean people's demands for freedom and independence. In response, Japan dispatched its army and brutally suppressed the movement. (Chapter 5, 6)” In a footnote on the same page, it states “It is claimed that approximately 8,000 people died as a result of Japan's suppression of this movement.” It seems clear that this book is nearly as pro-Korean in its interpretation of history as the previous book, since it points out that Koreans had “been suffering under the yoke of Japanese colonial rule” and that Japan “brutally suppressed the movement.” It also includes the death toll, though as that is a footnote, it is not as powerful a gesture as if it had been in the main text. While it would be best for the text to avoid emotional language, it is unlikely that Koreans would complain in this case. It is quite clear that this book in no way whitewashes Japanese history.

The Osaka book has this to say: “On 1 March, 1919, Koreans seeking independence issued a declaration of independence in Seoul (Keijo) and staged a noisy demonstration march, chanting their slogan, “Long Live Independence!” The movement spread to the whole of Korea, with an estimated 2 million people joining the demonstrations. The Japanese government mobilized the police and the armed
forces to suppress it. This movement is called the **Samil Independence Movement**, and was the spark that ignited subsequent Korean independence movements. Forced to modify its policies, the Japanese government was obliged to abolish the military police system and to allow the publication of Korean-language newspapers (Chapter 5, Part 2, 5-6).” This book seems to return to a less anti-Japanese tone, as it does not mention the death/injury toll, and also uses more neutral language to describe the suppression of the movement. This book also mentions some of the improvements Japan made in the wake of the movement, so it seems that the Osaka book is attempting to make Japan look somewhat better than the previous books.

Shimizu perhaps does the most whitewashing of all the books on the Samil Movement as it does not even mention that movement. It talks about the May 4th Movement in China, but has no information on Korea during this time period at all. Obviously, this book could be improved by actually including something about the Samil Movement.

Teikoku does not tell us much about the Samil Movement, but at least it says something: “in the Japanese colony of Korea, independence was declared in the Pagoda Park of Keijo (current day Seoul) on March 1, 1919. A people's movement proclaiming “Long live independence!” spread through Korea (the **Samil Independence Movement**). (Chapter 6, 7)” While this is an improvement over Shimizu, it still neglects historical background on why the movement happened at that time, and also it fails to point out Japan's suppression of the movement. This book also whitewashes the history, though at least it does mention the movement.

The Tokyo book shows rather more detail than the previous two: “in Korea, now under Japanese colonial rule, intellectuals and students committed to independence gathered in Seoul on March 1, 1919, and issued a statement declaring
Korea's independence from Japan. The people then marched in a demonstration, shouting “Long live independence!” Fueled by this incident, an independence movement quickly spread across all of Korea (the Samil Independence Movement).

The Government-General of Korea moved to put the movement down by force, but it also showed a willingness to relax its military rule, and as a result the campaign for Korea's modernization took on new vigor. The independence movement also continued thereafter. (Chapter 6, 6)” And in a footnote on the same page about the relaxation of military rule: “After the Samil Independence Movement, Japan recognized such rights as freedom of speech, freedom of the press, and freedom of assembly and adopted several new policies, such as enhancement of the education system.” While this at least does mention that the movement was put down by force, it fails to mention the death toll. Also it puts more detail into how Japan improved its rule over Korea than any other book – so this book does somewhat whitewash the history but not to too great an extent.

The overall picture is that the Japanese books tend to avoid going into too much detail on the Samil Independence Movement. Also, most do not include the death toll. Clear potential improvements would be to include the death/injury toll in all the books, and perhaps to stress that the movement was put down by force. Nihon Shoseki is by far the most anti-Japanese of the books, while Shimizu is in a sense the most pro-Japanese by virtue of not mentioning the movement at all. Now to see what the Korean books have to say.

The Jung book begins with “after losing their nation, our people continuously supported our independence movement despite the fierce Japanese colonization. Those Joseon people living outside of Korea also participated in that movement . . . the harder the Japanese tried to colonize Korea, the stronger the independence
movement became (265).” The most important thing to notice is the “fierce” Japanese colonization. Also, notice the heavy emphasis on “our people” - this shows that the book really wants the reader to fully empathize with the content of that sentence.

Later, the book states “around the time World War I ended . . . religious leaders in Joseon also became interested in the independence movement, having an alliance with student groups, they prepared for the independence movement. During that time, King Kojong . . . died in early 1919. Rumours spread that he had been poisoned by the Japanese, which strongly agitated the people (265).”

As this shows, the amount of detail in the Korean books is far greater than that in Japanese books, which is to be expected. This book includes the detail of a rumour that King Kojong was poisoned by the Japanese, which is not in any of the Japanese books.

Later “the Japanese police and army suppressed the people who peacefully participated in the movement with rifle and blade. At this time Yu Gwan-Sun who demonstrated in Cheonan, Chungcheongnam-Do, was arrested. She died in prison, and the Japanese army threw all the people in Hwaseong, Jiam-ni in a church and set fire to it, burning them to death. Many houses, schools, and so forth were destroyed by the evil actions of the Japanese (268).” This passage is very clearly anti-Japanese. The mention of the Japanese army using rifle and blade against peaceful protesters, Yu Gwan-Sun, and the Hwaseong incident proves that. As noted before, that incident is in fact a rumour or at least very exaggerated, as Pratt pointed out (217). Pratt also mentioned that the protests had turned violent, and so the Japanese were not actually using such force on peaceful protesters. Furthermore, the passage does not only let people make their own judgement on the actions of the Japanese, but tells them that Japanese actions were “evil.”
Finally, there is one other important quotation to be reported. “The Samil Movement clarified the aims of the people for autonomy and self-defence, and helped similar movements in other countries to proceed. . . The Samil Movement also affected many other national movements in other Asian countries, especially China and India, where there were national movements like the Samil Movement (268).” This is of note because it seems to excessively glorify Korea – certainly textbooks in China do not mention the Samil Movement at all, according to conversations held with Chinese people.

In general, the Jung book seems to be rather anti-Japanese in its outlook. In particular, the book goes too far in condemning Japan by reporting events that did not happen, saying that peaceful protesters were “brutally” repressed, and also using the term “evil” for Japan. The book also is perhaps too self-congratulatory to Korea, saying that the Samil movement affected other countries, which is not what the other countries tend to report. However, with the exception of those aforementioned items, the coverage is fairly balanced. Another important point is the lack of any killed/wounded/arrested statistic – it would seem that a Korean book would want to point that out.

As for the Godeung book, it too has more detail than the Japanese books, but far less detail than the other Korean texts. To wit: “even though our people were colonized by the invasion of the Japanese Empire, they tried their best to gain independence . . .

33 leaders published the Declaration of Independence and proclaimed Korea's independence within and without the country (March 1, 1919). . .

The movement started non-violently, but it started to become more violent, attacking local government offices, military buildings and Japanese companies . . .
Japan tried to suppress the movement by force . . .

It . . . also influenced other countries’ independence movements (117).”

This book is clearly more balanced than the Jung book. As can be seen, there is no emotional language, and while it is mentioned that Japan tried to suppress the movement by force, there is little else about Japan itself. This book also mentions the influence on other countries, but not that the Samil Movement “helped” or “affected” other countries, merely that there was some influence. Overall, the Godeung book is quite kind to Japan, at least by comparison. Again, a surprising omission is the killed, wounded, or imprisoned statistics. Oddly, so far only a couple of the Japanese books have mentioned that – none of the Korean books have. But let us see what the Jungang book has to say.

The first comment is that the level of detail in the Jungang book is extremely high, necessitating only a very small portion of the contents to be reprinted here. The first quotation is “on March 1st, 1919, the people's representatives originally planned to protest in Tapgol Park, but changed their plan to meet at Taehwagwan restaurant instead. The public could became excited enough to be violent, and they thought that would harm their ability to appeal for independence. Thus, after looking over the Declaration of Independence, the people in Taehwagwan gave three cheers and then contacted the Governor-General and were voluntarily arrested. . . Embarrassed by the sudden crisis, the Japanese tried to tramp out our nation's independence movement by gun and sword. However, the independence movement carried on without a stop (183).”

There are two key phrases in this passage. The first being that the leaders changed meeting venues because they were worried that the crowd might turn violent – and they even went so far as to turn themselves in. Secondly, this book says that the
Japanese tried to stop the movement by gun and sword, which is common to all the books, but this too does not mention any violent protests first, making the Japanese act completely unjustified.

Later, the book states “The Korean resistance to Japanese imperialism and oppression was tough. In Korea, two of the four Military Police units and thousands of troops and police were sent up to repress the protests. Japanese police and soldiers used the gun and the knife in riot control, and brutally suppressed the Korean people.

In addition, protesters were arrested at the scene, and others were tracked down and ruthlessly tortured. The suppression of Japan, as stated above, meant that many people were arrested, killed, or wounded (186).”

This passage is more balanced than the similar passage in the Jung book. The passage only talks about Japanese police and soldiers using guns and knives, brutal suppression, and torture, it does not include false incidents such as the church one mentioned in Jung. However, using the term brutal with suppression and the term ruthless with torture is again adding more emotion than necessary. It would be best to let the actions speak for themselves. This book, like the others also interestingly omits the numbers of killed, wounded, and arrested. It is hard to understand why.

Finally, in the section on the meaning of the Samil Movement, there is this passage: “the March 1st Movement brought changes in the way the Japanese ruled the country. The Japanese exploited the so-called cultural divide to rule the country and weaken our national consciousness in order to weaken the resistance.

The March 1st Movement had a significant effect on national liberation movements across the world . . . our country's March 1st Movement gave a lot of confidence to other colonies. Thus China's May 4th Movement and Gandhi's civil disobedience movement in India arose, and the national liberation movements in
Vietnam, the Philippines, and Egypt were given even greater impetus (187).”

Of importance is that this is the first book that talks about the change in Japanese governance after the movement, though it should be noted the use of the world “exploited” and the general idea that Japan tried to divide and conquer the Korean population. That might be excessive, and certainly downplays any Korean collaboration with the Japanese. This passage also has the same problem with the Jung book, in that it gives excessive praise to the Samil Movement. As it says, there is the “significant” effect on other national liberation movements, and it especially points out China’s May 4th Movement and Gandhi’s civil disobedience. As pointed out before, Chinese people do not give any credit to the Samil Movement for the May 4th Movement in China.

Overall, this book is somewhat more balanced than the Jung book, but still could benefit from removing some emotional language. Also, too much credit is given to the Samil Movement for affecting other countries. Finally, there is the odd omission of the casualty statistics, which is common to all the Korean books so far and most of the Japanese books.

The Geumseong book is perhaps most detailed of all the textbooks, and so again only a small percentage of the text will be directly quoted here. The first quote to be examined here is as follows: “The Samil Independence Movement at its core was organized by religious personnel . . . they appealed to foreign powers for our independence, and internally set policy based on the principle of a popular, nonviolent movement.

The people's representatives were originally going to read the Declaration of Independence in front of the crowd. However, more people showed up than expected, so due to concerns about crowd control, plans were changed to meet at a nearby
restaurant in Insa-Dong called Taehwagwan. Following the reading of the Declaration of Independence, the leaders were voluntarily imprisoned (172).”

First off, this book puts clear effort into emphasizing the nonviolent nature of the movement, which was not as clearly pointed out in other books. In addition, this book includes the information that the leaders changed plans and met in a restaurant instead of Tapgol Park. Unlike the previous book, however, this book only mentions crowd control as being the reason – the other books more clearly states that they were worried about the crowd turning violent. In a sense, this book gives a little more credit to the masses than the Jungang book does. Later in the same passage, the book also mentions that people came to Seoul for King Kojong's funeral, but omits the information about the rumour that the king was poisoned by the Japanese. This is probably a good thing, since a rumour is not a real fact, and does not really need to be reported.

Later, the book reports several different important things: “Beginning around March 10th, demonstrations happened at the local military units, and from late March to early April, the cry of independence was spread over the whole country. In the process, demonstrations lost their ties to the organized, nonviolent aspects of the framework. The changes took hold as farmers and workers became the mainstream of the demonstrators.

The spread of the independence movement across the whole country confounded the Japanese authorities, causing them to bring in the police, military police, firefighters, veterans, and more to stamp it out with gun and knife. Following the demonstrations, the Japanese army commenced ruthlessly slaughtering. Due to the hail of protests across the country, the jails were all filled up, and the Japanese army attempted genocide, carrying out atrocities such as the one at Jeam-ni. The fire
that was started with the March 1st demonstration continued until the end of April, in
spite of the Japanese crackdown (173).”

To begin with, this is the only book that states that military units got involved
in the movement. This book also notes that the movement became more violent as the
composition of demonstrators changed. In a sense, this book, like the Jungang book,
seems to be somewhat biased against farmers and workers – as it says, the protests
became violent when farmers and workers joined. Perhaps this is also meant to
encourage Korean children to have a distaste for blue-collar work? Leaving that aside
this book talks of the Japanese army “ruthlessly slaughtering” people. Even more
inflammatory is the part where the book says the Japanese army “attempted genocide,
carrying out atrocities such as the one at Jeam-ni.” That incident is described in a
sidebar. This kind of language is extremely emotional, and in fact, rather hyperbolic.
In particular, the reference to “attempted genocide” is clear hyperbole, and actually
suggests that the authors do not understand what genocide is. At any rate, this is
exactly the kind of language that this thesis is warning against – it is designed to
make students hate another country and will not help relations warm up. In addition,
as already discussed, the “atrocities” at Jeam-ni was only a rumour, and including it in
a textbook both makes the rumour appear true and serves to incite hatred.

Finally, the book goes on to say “even though the March 1st Movement was
frustrated by Japan's power, it formed the basis for the next organized movement.
Also, it was the first anti-imperialist nationalist movement in a colony after World
War I, and it influenced the May 4th Movement in China and influenced liberation
movements in other Asian nations. (174)”

This book is a little closer to the Godeung book as far as the aftereffects of
the movement go. It talks about the domestic effects in great detail after the quoted
passage, but does not excessively praise the movement's foreign effects. It does speak of influencing the May 4th Movement and influencing other liberation movements, but it does not go nearly as far as the Jungang book does.

Overall, it seems that the Geumseong book is by far the most anti-Japanese in its outlook of the Korean textbooks when it comes to the Samil Movement. Certainly, when it describes the Japanese response, the book goes over the top in its descriptions. Calling the Japanese crackdown “genocide” is taking it several steps too far. Therefore, the main recommendation for this book is the removal of such emotional (and ridiculous) wording. In addition, it is a bit odd that the book talks about the workers and farmers making the protest take a violent turn. It seems that this book (and to a lesser extent the Jungang book) has some type of anti-blue collar viewpoint in addition, and for no apparent reason. Finally, the book, like all the other Korean books, omits the casualty statistics, which seems a bit odd.

Comparing the Japanese and Korean books, it is impressive that many Japanese books are very nearly as against Japanese actions during the Samil Movement as the Korean books are. The Nihon Shoseki in particular stands out for talking about Japan's “brutal repression.” In addition, it is odd that some of the Japanese books included the death/injury/arrested tolls, while not a single Korean book did. This particular omission is rather odd, as most of the Korean books also talk about Japan's brutality. One or two Japanese books gloss over the Samil Movement, but they are a clear minority. The Japanese books could be improved by making sure that all of them include the Samil Independence Movement, and the casualty toll would be useful as well. As for the Korean books, most of those should avoid the use of emotional language.
V. Conclusion

The current common view on Japanese textbooks is that those books do nothing but glorify Japan’s past and whitewash any past wrongdoing. This coupled with the lack of literature on Korean textbooks implies that Japanese textbooks are always wrong or bad, and that Korean textbooks must be free of error, since there are no negative reports about them. This would also lead one to expect Japanese and Koreans to feel differently about each others’ history. Certainly the survey results on Japanese and South Korean attitudes used earlier in the thesis would lead one to expect huge differences in what the two different populations are being taught.

Instead, it turns out that the news reports on Japan vastly overstate the problem. In fact, it was interesting to find that many Japanese books actually included levels of detail on events in Korea that were very close to what was in Korean textbooks. If the Nihon Shoseki book from Japan is directly compared with the Godeung book from Korea, it turns out that the Shoseki book actually has more detail on nearly all the events covered in this paper than the Godeung book does – the Japanese book is actually more detailed than the Korean book. As an example, it gives statistics on the dead and wounded of the Samil Movement, which is missing from all the Korean textbooks studied. However, this is only one case. Overall, it is a very mixed bag. The books in each country have great variance between them, and each country is naturally different, yet many of the Japanese and Korean books describe the same events in a similar way, though the Korean books typically show more detail. It is also found that many, though not all Japanese books do admit to a degree of guilt for the various events studied in this paper. Additional research should later be conducted in the same vein, comparing the books for events that happened
either before or after the scope of time examined in this paper, such as the formation of ancient Korea and Japan or the Hideyoshi invasions from before the scope of this paper, or World War II and all related issues, such as comfort women from after the scope of this paper.

The key recommendation of this paper is that the two countries should be very careful in how they write their textbooks. Each should be careful to accurately portray history and not to excessively glorify their own country or demonize other countries.

The major recommendations that this paper will make for the Japanese books are that they should all include information on the important incidents in Korea that were caused or exacerbated by Japan. In particular, all books should talk about the assassination of Empress Min – an important event for Koreans, and one that was clearly Japan's fault. Only the Nihon Shoseki mentions this event, all the rest do not. In addition, the Japanese books should all include more information on the Samil Movement, and in particular the casualties. Japanese books could also cut back on emotional language. Most of the books use very little emotional language, but there is still some. However, as this emotional language is usually blaming Japan, it is likely that Korean people would not object to it. Otherwise, there are surprisingly few problems with Japanese textbooks, which typically acknowledge Japanese blame for various events.

As for Korea, certain events, in particular the Kanghwa-Do treaty, are treated pretty much the same between Korean and Japanese textbooks. The Imo Mutiny and Kapsin Coup are also dealt with in similar terms between the Korean and Japanese books. Interestingly, the Korean books actually tend to blame internal causes for the Tonghak Rebellion whereas the Japanese books are quicker to point out Japanese
fault for that. It is the coverage of the Samil Movement that really needs to be changed in Korean textbooks. Of greatest importance would be toning down the language – the Geumseong book being the worst offender. A textbook should not throw around the term “genocide” lightly. Such language clearly encourages Korean students to hate Japan whereas Japanese books do not encourage Japanese students to hate Japan (and many of them do point out Japanese wrongdoing). In addition, when talking about the after effects of the Samil Movement, books should be careful not to give too much credit to the influence of that movement overseas. This is because such statements serve to increase the pride of students in their own country, which should not be done on the basis of half-truths (or less). In general, these books need to avoid vilifying Japan and glorifying Korea so much. The former is of great importance, the latter less important, but still of some value. Certainly, it is unlikely that Korean people will feel any closer to their Asian brethren if they have too much national pride. And it will be impossible for Koreans and Japanese to feel much mutual goodwill if Korean students are taught to hate Japanese (especially when Japanese are not taught to hate them).

At this point, it should once again be pointed out that there are some limitations to this paper. Because this paper relies on the existing English translations of the Japanese textbooks, which only cover the period from the Meiji Restoration until a little before World War II, some events that are considered key issues in Korea could not be covered – like the comfort women issue of World War II. As the comfort women issue in particular is one of the most important issues between Korea and Japan today, the inability to compare coverage of this issue may have strongly influenced the findings of this paper, since only events of secondary importance could be compared. In addition, the omission of the assassination of Empress Min in
most of the Japanese books is also a problem. Because of these omissions, it is possible that this paper does not give enough coverage to problems with the Japanese books, though the problems pointed out with Korean books still stand.

There is one other interesting approach that could be taken by both Korea and Japan, and this is the approach described by Falk Pingel (2008, 189) as being used by Israeli and Palestinian educators in a test project. The idea is that in sections where two nations have a shared history divide the book into three columns. The left and right columns contain the history as generally accepted by one or the other nation, and the centre column is left blank so that the teachers and students may write down their own impressions and observations.

This approach might be of great value in both Japan and Korea as students could get a glimpse of what people in the other country know or believe. In addition, schools in East Asia are often derided for using too much rote memorization and not allowing students to think for themselves enough. In this situation, it may be possible to solve two problems at once: improve education by letting students think on their own more, and also to improve the understanding of students in both countries about the opinions of the other side. It is a tantalizing possibility – and also would be a good step in improving bilateral relations. If the two countries could successfully cooperate on writing a history textbook that fully examines their shared history, then surely they could also come to terms with their shared history in a manner satisfying to both sides. For the shorter term, it might be best to think on a smaller scale. The most important thing is Japanese sincere efforts to openly disclose their atrocities and in return some form of forgiveness on the part of Koreans. If Germany and France could do it, why not South Korea and Japan?
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